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From: laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Re: Rosen on reason, etc.
Message-ID: <5108@utzoo.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 25-Feb-85 20:00:00 EST
Article-I.D.: utzoo.5108
Posted: Mon Feb 25 20:00:00 1985
Date-Received: Mon, 25-Feb-85 20:00:00 EST
References: <147@ISM780B.UUCP>
Organization: U of Toronto Zoology
Lines: 26

What I thought Rosen was saying was that the notion of free will
is linked to the notion of ``soul'' -- an ephemeral, non-physical
``self'' that is not influenced by physical things. This isn't
what I thought that Torek was talking about. I think that the 2
concepts are distinct.

I also thought that Rosen implied that one had to freely choose to
have free will -- something which I do not think Torek ever implied.
I think that Torek implied that you are stuck (``condemned'' in
Jean Paul Sartre's view) with freedom.

I do not think that predictability (or lack of same) is the same as
free will. For instance, it would be very easy for someone who knows me
to predict that I will do laundry on Sundays -- I always do it then. However,
I don't think that the predictability of this action means that I am not
free to do laundry some other day or to not do laundry and wear dirty
clothes. It may be meaningful to say that I am not free to buy new
clothes and thus never do laundry nor wear dirty clothes (since I cannot
afford this) or that I am not free to go to work nude (since I would
face imprisonment) -- but that the probability is near 100% that I
will do laundry Sunday does not seem to limit my freedom - as long as
there are alternatives which I *could have chosen*. Are you saying that
I could not have chosen otherwise but merely feel that I could have?

Laura Creighton
utzoo!laura