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From: mck@ratex.UUCP (Daniel Kian Mc Kiernan)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy,net.legal
Subject: The morality of morals -- some suggestions
Message-ID: <897@ratex.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 23-Feb-85 21:33:26 EST
Article-I.D.: ratex.897
Posted: Sat Feb 23 21:33:26 1985
Date-Received: Wed, 27-Feb-85 03:44:14 EST
Organization: TMP Styling Salons
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Xref: watmath net.philosophy:1477 net.legal:1449


Ms. Lauzon:

     Oi vay!  What a can of worms you have opened!

     I think that you need to tackle the following problems:

     What is *morality*?  Is it a set of rules governing personal
interaction?  All cases of personal interaction, or only some; and, if only
some, which cases and why the division?  Can actions be immoral simply
because of their affect on the acter (eg: drug abuse)?  Can actions be
wrong simply because of their affect on a non-person (eg: abuse of an
beast)?  I would define 'morality' such that all actions which affect
persons are covered by its rules, and that actions can only be defined as
moral or immoral in terms of the affects on persons (eg: I would hold beast
abuse as wrong because of its affect on the persons involved).
     What constitutes *prohibition*?  Here I think that you should deal
with the concept of 'property'; and, if you find it viable, introduce
concepts of 'coercion' and 'retaliation' defined in terms of property,
and both subsumed under the concept of 'force'.  Then you need to deal with
the morality of prohibitions which are non-coercive, coercive, and
retaliatory.  Don't forget to deal with the problems of prohibitting
prohibitions.
     With clear notions of 'morality', 'prohibition', 'property',
'coercion', and 'retaliation', I think that you can reach the following
conclusions:
          Not all immorality is morally prohibitable.
          Not all immorality which IS morally prohibitable is morally
          forcibly prohibitable.
          Some moral acts are morally prohibitable without being morally
          forcibly prohibitable.
          Some moral acts are morally forcibly prohibitable.
(An example where someone has argued that a morally forcibly prohibitable
act is nevertheless moral is given in *The Ethics of Liberty* by Murray
Newton Rothbard, in a discussion of Lifeboat situations.  Rothbard is a lousy
philosopher, but it's interesting to see a Libertarian presenting such an
argument -- and, anyway, it'll be good for a footnote!)

                                        Bye,
                                        Daniel Kian Mc Kiernan
                                        The Nearly Unreachable