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From: jim@ISM780B.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Re: Torek on Rosen, etc.
Message-ID: <146@ISM780B.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 21-Feb-85 01:32:17 EST
Article-I.D.: ISM780B.146
Posted: Thu Feb 21 01:32:17 1985
Date-Received: Wed, 27-Feb-85 04:08:37 EST
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Nf-ID: #R:pyuxd:-54500:ISM780B:27500061:000:8933
Nf-From: ISM780B!jim    Feb 19 19:22:00 1985

>I think Trissel's article on the chess program and my own articles have stated
>repeatedly that your definition is simply an assertion of something you believe
>and NOT an actual definition of free will as the term is understood.  To
>redefine the term so that, under the new definition, it DOES exist, does not
>in turn cause the originally described phenonemon to suddenly exist as a result.

This indicates a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of perceived
reality and the role of language and semantics.
No phenomenon exists independently of words or definitions.
A phenomenon is a semantic carving out of a piece of the happening of the
universe.  Does a flame exist?  It is identified by light and heat sensations
or burning effects or a confluence of substances or reactions between
other entities (also phenomena) or probability waves or ?  What is it really?
All aspects of it existence independent of the existence of everything else
are strictly the result of labeling; semantics.  It is absurd to talk about
the "phenomenon of free will" "existing".  It is the philosopher's task to
come up with definitions which are internally consistent and which have an
optimal correlation with the shared semantics as revealed and defined by
standard or normal usage, and to notice how the attempts reveal false
notions and inconsistencies in our conceptual set.  I find it very sad
that people are still arguing over whether a Euglena is animal or vegetable.
The whole point is to not locate the phenomenon of free will, but rather
to *decide* what the damn phrase should mean so that it can be used in
discourse.

>It's funny you should ask that.  One person I spoke to in searching for such an
>"ordinary language user" defined free will as the ability to generate ideas or
>make decisions independent of external dependencies.  He defined external
>dependencies to include one's surroundings and one's chemistry.  When I
>returned to his office later and asked "external to what?" (anticipating
>questions you might ask), he paused to ponder, and I mentioned your notion
>that the "you" IS the chemicals.  Suddenly, his officemate, overhearing the
>bizarre conversation (who talks about free will during working hours?), blurted
>out "But doesn't the notion of free will imply a spirit that is separate from
>the chemicals?"  I couldn't have asked for more, could I have?  I doubt that
>he's alone in that.  As far as I can tell, that is THE common conception of
>what free will means, and what it has been throughout.

People talked about free will long before they knew anything about chemicals.
Your fundamental problem is that you cannot understand two semantic levels
at the same time.  Everything has to be either/or.  The chemicals in one's
brain are external to the "mind", "spirit", "I" that does the thinking and
choosing, *even if* that mind is completely a manifestation of the workings
of those chemicals (and I cannot imagine it being otherwise).
The ego and the chemicals are two different things, because things are just
different ways of semantically/conceptually carving pieces out of the process
of reality.  There is no way in which the one set of measurable, perceivable,
describable phenomena (mind, personality, etc.) is less real than the
other (chemicals), even though one can be described as an organization of
the other.  If you say the mind isn't real, than you must also say the
chemicals are not real.  You and the behaviorists constantly confuse
something being "real" with something being *composite*.
Do guns kill people, or do people kill people?  Bullets kill people.
Loss of brain function kills people.  Does poverty cause crime,
or do nasty people who live in ghettos cause crime?
The notion that A cannot cause or be responsible for C if B is responsible
for C is blatantly fallacious and stupid, but is very widely used.

As long as you insist that the agent or "spirit" that possesses free will
must be completely independent of all other agents, then of course you will
decide that free will does not exist, because such an agent is necessarily
not describable or available to conception.  But a definition
which is internally inconsistent is semantically empty
(read Raymond Smullyan).

I suggest that you go back to your roommate's friend, whose point of view
on chemicals you so readily accepted as reflecting the common conception,
and ask him whether he *feels* like he has free will, contemplate whether
his answer matches the common conception, and then try to find a meaning
of the term that encompasses whatever it is that people are feeling when
they say they have free will.  I have my notions on this, and I have expressed
them here before; let's see what you come up with.

>well, don't rivers and rocks make "decisions" about which way they will flow
>and fall?  Quite rational, they way they make those "decisions"...  From your
>torekocentric perspective, you say "*I*, the human, AM making decisions; these
>'inanimate' objects are not!!"  On what basis?

One difference is the degree to which the causal origin coincides with the
locus of the entity in question.  A rock which falls because the ground
under it gave way cannot in any sense be considered to have chosen.
If however, the rock expands and thereby shifts its position, the distinction
becomes less clear.  But "decision" is not some absolute phenomenon that
either does or does not exist, any more than whether the Euglena is animal
or vegetable is some absolute fact that it is our duty to determine.
Rather, "decision" is a word used in discourse; words are tools which
represent interconnected concepts; we use them because we cannot communicate
directly.  When someone uses the word "decision", people usually assume
that it refers to a choosing agent.  Whether we consider an agent to be
capable of choice depends upon the variety of actions that agent seems
to have at its disposal, its sensitivity to circumstance, the "rationality"
of its "choices" based largely on their correlation with what we would have
chosen, and a whole host of other subjective criteria.
Have you yourself ever thought "I wonder what s/he will decide?"
Have you ever thought "I wonder what that rock will decide?"
Have you ever thought "I wonder what that collection of chemicals will
decide?"
Has a collection of atoms ever (what?)
The disparity between your honest answers to these questions and your
form of argument should alert you to the possibility that you are making
a fundamental error.  (You do entertain this possibility, don't you?
I certainly do for myself.)
The very fact that there is a you, whatever that is, responding
internally to these words and planning a response that it seems (to what
agent?) like there is a point and a purpose for should
alert you, and should help you recognize that the fact that there
are a lot of chemicals doing their thing and "causing" these reactions is
*at some level*, irrelevant.

>Oh?  The notion of proof involves making no assumptions either way about the
>validity/falsehood of a notion, and showing that, based on other assumed or
>proven givens, it MUST be so.  Try doing that for logic...

The fact that you even speak coherently indicates acceptance of inference
rules.  Just to utter the words "I don't use logic" demands acceptance
of the fundamental operations of logic.  Logic cannot justify itself
*outside of langauge and human discourse*, but so what?  As soon as
we note that we are communicating well enough to believe we are sharing
the same concepts, it can be demonstrated that we have been using inference
rules.  Thus, a belief system without logic is not possible in anyone
who could try to convince me of it, or who could even conceptualize it.

The proper question is not "If no one is there to hear it, does a tree
falling in the forest make a sound?", but rather, "If there is no one
to think about it or discuss it, do falling trees make a sound?".  Who cares?
But as long as we are using the words "tree" or "sound" or "logic" in ways
that *are* distinguishable from "hot fudge sauce", we are all presupposing
logic, and those who claim otherwise are merely ignorant.

>I could have a
>system of belief that claimed "All cats have four legs" AND "All cats have
>nine legs".  How would you prove the incorrectness of such a belief system
>WITHOUT assuming the veracity of logic.

What does prove *mean*?  My definition of proof contains sufficient rules
of logic to prove you wrong.  If yours doesn't, I can only assume you are
using the word "prove" where you really mean "hot fudge sauce".
You may tell me that there is something wrong with my definition, but
I certainly won't believe you just on your word.  Whereas, you will find
yourself believing the proof *despite yourself*, because the rules of
inference are something fundamental to the way we think, not merely an
arbitrary set of assumptions.

-- Jim Balter (ima!jim)