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From: renner@uiucdcs.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: results of poll of world news servic
Message-ID: <29200205@uiucdcs.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 19-Feb-85 04:24:00 EST
Article-I.D.: uiucdcs.29200205
Posted: Tue Feb 19 04:24:00 1985
Date-Received: Thu, 21-Feb-85 07:46:28 EST
References: <134@rtech.UUCP>
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Nf-ID: #R:rtech:-13400:uiucdcs:29200205:000:1334
Nf-From: uiucdcs!renner    Feb 19 03:24:00 1985


>  No arms control treaty has ever been negotiated that is not verifiable.
>  Period.   The free press is not considered one of the national technical
>  means used to verify arms control treaties.  Satellites and listening
>  devices turn out to be much more effective.
>  				-- Mike Kelly (mjk@tty3b)

The 1972 ABM treaty prohibits deployment of anti-ballistic missile
systems.  The Soviets are building a large phased-array radar system in
Siberia -- very nice for tracking ICBMS; they say it's for their space
program.  They are building a system of surface-to-air missiles which
may well have ABM capability; they say they are for defense against
high-altitude bombers (of which we have none; the B-52 may have been
designed that way, decades ago, but isn't equipped to fly that way now).

Satellites and listening devices won't tell us what the radar system is
really for.  Someone would have to go and take a look.  The Soviets
won't let us do that.  Therefore, there is no way we can verify Soviet
compliance with this treaty.

As far as I am concerned, the word "verifiable" should be taken to mean
"on-site inspections by US military personnel."  With so much at risk, why
should we settle for less?  What reason could the Soviets have to object,
except that they plan to cheat?

Scott Renner
{ihnp4,pur-ee}!uiucdcs!renner