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From: mjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly)
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: poll  (nuclear disarmament verifiability)
Message-ID: <613@tty3b.UUCP>
Date: Fri, 22-Feb-85 17:06:25 EST
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Posted: Fri Feb 22 17:06:25 1985
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From: js2j@mhuxt.UUCP (sonntag)
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     You're going to 'listen' for hidden nuclear missiles?  Suprise!  They
actually *don't* make ticking noises.  Get serious!  How could a thing like
that be verified without extensive searching (over the whole world) by both
sides, continuously?  Test-ban treaties are easy to verify, of course, but
that's not what we're talking about here.

Seriously, almost *everyone* would be for disarmament if we thought it could
be mutual and verifiable.  I wouldn't trust my *own* government to actually
disarm, though, much less the USSR's.
-------------------------------------

First, our satellites *do* extensively search the world continuously.
Second, the means of verification would have to be built into the treaty.
That might require on-site inspection.  Both sides are quite well aware of
the number, size and location of strategic missiles.  The treaty would include
a mutually agreeable procedure for dismantling these.  

The fact that cruise and other missiles are much more difficult to verify is
precisely why arms control becomes more urgent by the day.
Our ability to hide is constantly pushing ahead of our ability to detect.  If
the new cruise missiles are deployed in large numbers, the problem becomes much
more difficult.  As Henry Kissinger once said of his decision to MIRV our missiles
(a move the Soviets, of course, quickly copied), "I wish I'd thought out the
consequences of a MIRVed world."  We wish you had, too, Henry.  (The consequences
are destabilizing, since first strike becomes theoretically more attractive --
one missile can knock out several warheads.)

The point is that things that can't be verified aren't involved in the negotiations.
Verification is built-in.

And a comprehensive test-ban would be just fine, as a first step, because it would
mean an end to development of new technology within short order.

Mike Kelly