Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site tty3b.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!cbosgd!ihnp4!mgnetp!ltuxa!tty3b!mjk From: mjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly) Newsgroups: net.politics Subject: Re: results of poll of world news servic Message-ID: <621@tty3b.UUCP> Date: Tue, 26-Feb-85 11:42:45 EST Article-I.D.: tty3b.621 Posted: Tue Feb 26 11:42:45 1985 Date-Received: Thu, 28-Feb-85 20:03:16 EST References: <134@rtech.UUCP> <13700007@uiucdcsp.UUCP> Organization: Teletype Corp., Skokie, Ill Lines: 87 >From: ashby@uiucdcsp.UUCP >Well, I'll be. I never thought I'd see the day when I would be called a >"wimp" for believing in a strong defense. Tim Sevener seems to equate >machismo with risk-taking; he may well be correct. The nut who walks >a dark alley at night may call himself macho, but most of us would call >him stupid. I do not advocate chest-pounding bravado; I merely advocate >prudence. And I feel it is prudent to distrust the Soviet Union ... There are risks in both directions. The basis of arms control is the prudent realization on both sides that an unrestrained arms buildup is a risk, and that this risk frequently outweighs the risk in making an agreement with a country you don't trust. Of course, improvement in verification technology and in various cooperative measures (such as well-defined counting rules incorporated into arms control treaties, which lay out the basis for deciding what is and isn't covered by the treaty) have helped reduce the risk of arms control treaties. To say "I'm for a strong defence because I'm prudent" is a non sequitur. No one opposes a strong defence; the question is how strong and what balance is struck between the risks of arms build-up and the risks of arms control. >[Tim Sevener] conveniently ignores all the other treaties that the >Soviets have ALREADY violated. In particular, he ignores the ABM treaty. >With their *deployment* of the very large array antennae, they are currently >violating this treaty. [Let me save you some typing: the US's research >into the SDI (popularly called "Star Wars" by the dim-witted) does NOT >violate this treaty; research is explicitly allowed.] "Soviet compliance performance under fourteen arms control agreements signed since 1959 has been good." - Joint statement by Department of Defense, State Department and Joint Chiefs of Staff issued in 1980 What exactly are "all the other treaties that the Soviets have ALREADY violated?" If the one example cited here is representative -- the ABM treaty -- then these aren't really violations, but Reagan Administration allegations. There are clear procedures for settling these allegations, through the Standing Consultative Committee. The SCC has clarified previous ambiguous activity, and in some cases, halted it altogether. The problem is that, amidst wild charges of widespread Soviet violations -- and all of the previous charges were investigated by previous Administrations and found to be without merit -- it is difficult to address a truly serious charge. The construction in Siberia of the radar station is a serious matter and deserves consideration. But it is unlikely that it will get that amidst the poisoned atomsphere generated by all the unfounded allegations distributed by the Reagan Administration. It is important to remember that treaties are often ambiguously worded, and there are few clear violations -- that's why the SCC exists, to arbitrate charges. As Paul Warnke said, "We wanted a certain amount of wiggle room, and therefore gave them a certain amount of wiggle room." These headlines indicate what happens when this cycle gets started: "Study Says Soviet Broke Arms Pacts President to Release a Report That Accuses Moscow of 17 Violations Since '58" - New York Times, September 12, 1984 "Moscow Accuses U.S. Of Violating Arms Agreements Diplomatic Note to the State Department Charges Wide Range of American Offenses" - New York Times, January 30, 1984 >Finally, I ask Tim to note that it was Reagan's resolute stance that >brought the USSR back to the arms table. RR didn't cave in to their >demands for a "moritorium" on the cruise and Pershings. They backed down. >He didn't cave in to their demands for talks only on space weapons. They >backed down. What happened as a result of Reagan's "inflexibility"? Well, >surprise, suprise, the Soviets backed down from their inflexibility. The Geneva talks are a great opportunity, but judging from the general attitude in the Reagan Administration towards arms control, it will take a great deal of pressure to achieve any significant advance. One concept that has a lot of merit is the Negotiators' Pause, which is a proposal that both sides stop testing and deploying while the negotiations are ongoing. This recognizes that it is difficult to negotiate about a moving target. Furthermore, if you believe in bargaining chips, it lets you have bargaining chips without having to pay for the deployment -- you can continue research and development and threaten deployment. Mike Kelly