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From: josh@topaz.ARPA (J Storrs Hall)
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: Re: Freedom, coercion, and free markets (III)
Message-ID: <694@topaz.ARPA>
Date: Tue, 19-Feb-85 02:04:24 EST
Article-I.D.: topaz.694
Posted: Tue Feb 19 02:04:24 1985
Date-Received: Thu, 21-Feb-85 05:20:01 EST
References: <328@gargoyle.UChicago.UUCP> <4793@ucbvax.ARPA> <99@ucbcad.UUCP>
Organization: Rutgers Univ., New Brunswick, N.J.
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>> >Suppose A offers something that B must have -- water when he is
>> >stranded in the desert -- but at an exorbitant price.  Is he not then
>> >coerced?  
>> 
>> Yes, he is not then coerced.
>
>So what if A again offers B something that he must have -- that A not
>shoot him -- at great price? This is coercion. But I don't see much
>difference. (Unless you want to say that it is a difference between
>doing and not doing something, in which case I'll think of some more
>examples. But you probably get the idea.)
>	Wayne

You are claiming that because you cannot see where to draw the line
between them, there is no difference between coercing someone and
failing to do something good for someone.

Consider the following situations:  (a) I shoot Mr. A.  (b) I stand
by (I am unarmed) while Mr. B shoots Mr A.  I could have saved Mr A
(for a minute at least) by jumping in front of the gun at the cost 
of my own life.  

By your (and Carnes') definition, I am coercing Mr A equally in (a)
and (b).  This is preposterous.  Just because you can imagine a lot
of twilight situations doesn't mean there is no difference between
night and day.

I offer someone a choice of their money or their life, am I coercing them?
It depends on what would have happened if I hadn't been there at all.
If the "victim" has a choice of proceeding as if I had never existed,
I am not coercing him.  If I offer someone the choice of giving me his
wallet or I will shoot him, he would obviously prefer "none of the above".
Thus I'm coercing him.  If I offer him water in the desert, he has the
option of replying, "Buzz off, smelly bum!" and I'm not coercing him.

Our Socialist friends will instantly respond that I am (in some cases)
sitting on some property, and they would like nothing better than to
wish me to disappear so they could have it.  Am I not coercing them?
After all, they'd like to act as if I weren't there.  Well, remember,
what I said was "had never existed".  The desert fellow can hardly
expect me to walk miles to his side with a glass of water and then 
vanish conveniently leaving him with the goods.  He must choose that
I never poured it or carried it in the first place.  

Similarly, if I have a house that I built with my own hands, the socialist
must accept that I am not coercing him to live in it without inviting
him.  If I hadn't existed, the house wouldn't have either.

Similarly, if I sold the house and bought another, he would have no right 
to it.  If I had not existed, I couldn't have bought it, and it would 
belong to someone else.  If the socialist wishes that no one else had
ever existed, it would never have been built in the first place.

So the existence of property per se is not coercion.  This is not to 
say that it cannot be acquired without coercion--we all have our favorite
examples.  It is a subject of considerable interest to propertarians
just which rights are legitimate property rights (ie, non-coercive)
and which aren't.  

Since I anticipate that Carnes will run crying to his dictionary,
I will suggest that in future discussions we make clear just what we
mean by "coercion".  I've provided a clear and usable definition, I think.

--JoSH