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From: barry@ames.UUCP (Kenn Barry)
Newsgroups: net.religion
Subject: Re: Torek's wager and its rationality
Message-ID: <810@ames.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 20-Feb-85 20:06:19 EST
Article-I.D.: ames.810
Posted: Wed Feb 20 20:06:19 1985
Date-Received: Fri, 22-Feb-85 14:32:09 EST
References: <748@wucs.UUCP>
Organization: NASA-Ames Research Center, Mtn. View, CA
Lines: 66

>From: barry@ames.UUCP (Kenn Barry)
>> ...if I "believe" something, that means I think it's *true* ...
>> Now, as far as I can see, the desirability, or lack of it, possessed
>> by the notion of "free will", has no bearing on the likelihood of its
>> being *true*. So what I get from your argument, is either that "believing"
>> something DOESN'T mean thinking it's true, or that the desirability of
>> a proposition (like free will) constitutes evidence for its being true.
>
>The former, given what you mean by "*true*".  But first to correct your
>terminology here:  it is *not* the desirability of "free will" that is
>crucial but the can't-lose nature of *believing* in it.  Furthermore
>the "gain" or "loss" involved is *knowledge*:  if you believe in free
>will and are right you gain knowledge; if wrong your lack of knowledge
>was inevitable anyway so no loss.

	How have I gained knowledge? If I believe in free will for the
reasons you propose, and I happen to be correct, I've made a lucky guess.

>	Now on to "*true*".  If truth is construed as "what we ought to
>believe", a la William James, then I am saying that "desirability" is
>relevant to truth.  Note that James's definition is a *reforming*
>definition, not a *reporting* one.  If you reject it in favor of a 
>"correspondance theory" of truth, then you face exactly two possibili-
>ties:  either all such truths are what we ought to believe, or some 
>aren't.  If some aren't, THEN SO MUCH THE WORSE FOR THOSE TRUTHS.

	Since I would *define* "what we ought to believe" as those things
which are true (correspondence theory), no contradictions can arise.
I still don't see why you want to stretch a good, usable word like "truth"
to include harmless and pleasurable ideas, without regard to their factual
accuracy. There is no "correspondence theory" of truth; it's a definition,
not a theory. Why argue definitions? We both seem to agree that belief
in free will is harmless, ought to be pleasant, and is as likely to be
accurate as determinism is. We also both agree that free will may or
may not be a factually correct description of reality. Or so I gather.
If we do agree on these things, I'm perfectly willing to let you reform
the definition of "truth" to include your justifications for belief in
free will. But can I have some other word, please, to denote only ideas
that correctly describe reality?

>	Look at it this way:  accepting a hypothesis is a *decision*.
>There are two things relevant to a decision -- the consequences of the
>decision under each possible "way the world is", and the probability
>of each of those possible ways the world is.  The decision is clearcut
>in case either:  there is only one possible way the world is, given the
>evidence, in which case the consequences of each alternative are known
>with certainty; or:  one alternative has consequences *at least as good*
>in every possible case and better in at least one, in which case it is
>superior and the evidence for probabilites is irrelevant.  This second
>case applies to free will.

	There is, of course, another possibility: admitting that you
don't have enough evidence to decide the question, and having no opinion.
Your logic still seems like it could be used to justify ridiculous
assumptions. Why shouldn't I believe, for instance, that I will surely
go to Heaven when I die? Wouldn't your logic justify that belief, too?
It's not disprovable, and its consequences are at least as good in every
possible case, and better in one. If you argue that my belief in a certain
heavenly reward might cause my damnation by a vengeful god, I could argue
the very same about your belief in free will.

-  From the Crow's Nest  -                      Kenn Barry
                                                NASA-Ames Research Center
                                                Moffett Field, CA
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