Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/5/84; site wucs.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxr!ihnp4!wucs!esk From: esk@wucs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: freedom and reason (attn russ, rich, & laura) Message-ID: <835@wucs.UUCP> Date: Tue, 12-Mar-85 18:29:48 EST Article-I.D.: wucs.835 Posted: Tue Mar 12 18:29:48 1985 Date-Received: Wed, 13-Mar-85 04:03:23 EST Reply-To: pvt1047@wucec1.UUCP (Paul V. Torek) Organization: Washington U. in St. Louis, CS Dept. Lines: 81 [] laura@utzoo.UUCP (Laura Creighton) writes: > Why does there have to be a ``ghost in the machine'', or, alternately, > no ability to effect changes by choice in one's life? That I started > out as an undifferentiated cell zygote that did not have language ability > does not mean that I had to stay that way -- why is ``free will'' any > different? Exactly. "Free will" is an ability, and like language ability, it is an ability one can come to have without exercising that ability. That is, there is no infinite regress involved in having the ability to make choices, any more than there is in having language ability. > I also thought that Rosen implied that one had to freely choose to > have free will -- something which I do not think Torek ever implied. > I think that Torek implied that you are stuck (``condemned'' in > Jean Paul Sartre's view) with freedom. You are "stuck" with freedom in the sense that you cannot just will it away. Also in the sense that you did not have to choose to have it in order to have it. However, you can damage your brain and thereby eliminate the basis for freedom. BTW, I agree with Laura that predictability (or lack of same) is not the same as free will. When we talk about choice we are not talking about predictability or lack thereof. rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff) writes: > Are we going to do this again? In recent discussions with Paul Torek, > I've been trying to explain that the concept of free will as it is > commonly defined DIRECTLY IMPLIES the notion of a soul or external agent. But it ain't so... > To be truly *free* to make any "decision", the agent of choice MUST be > outside of the realm of cause and effect, external to the physiochemical > makeup of the brain and body. Wrong again! > True freedom has nothing to do with rational evaluative capabilities. > True freedom would involve the ability to make decisions independent of > ANY external physical cause, INCLUDING the rational evaluative processes. > If one is truly free, one is truly free to choose either rationality or > irrationality at will, and not simply based on making a rational choice. Such a "choice" is the logical equivalent of a square circle. The notion of choosing between rationality and irrationality involves the person in *representing* the options to himself. But such a representation itself would already involve the use of reason. And there could be no basis for such a choice, since reason must be used to see why the basis for choice justifies the choice. The fact that Rich's definition of free will leads to such absurdities shows that it should be rejected. rwh@aesat.UUCP (Russ Herman) writes: > When you say "I have language ability", that's a self-evident truth. ... > But when you say "I have free will", that's like saying "I have a > personal deity". Actually, when you say "I have free will" while making (what we ordinarily would describe as) a choice, that's a self-evident truth too. (!) > Have you ever known any clinical paranoids? They're *wonderful* at > reasoning. Only problem is that their perceptions are out to lunch. They're wonderful at logic, maybe. Perception involves some use of reason, I think (as Kuhnians et. al. will insist, it's not just the reception of neutral data), at least when it comes to making judgements based on our sensory input. Anyway, please feel free to substitute "reason and experience" everywhere I previously said "reason", and you'll get my meaning. > How can you or I prove whether our core values are rational, or a product > of our social and familial conditioning? [why not both --pvt] We certainly > start from the latter position. Then, how can we distinguish between > being rational and rationalizing? It's simple; you search for biases in your conditioning that lead you to irrationality. In the beginning you find plenty; as you proceed it gets harder to find error ... you never get to perfect rationality, but you can approach it asymptotically. --The aspiring iconoclast, Paul V. Torek, ihnp4!wucs!wucec1!pvt1047 Don't hit that 'r' key! Send any mail to this address, not the sender's.