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From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: freedom and reason (attn russ, rich, & laura)
Message-ID: <689@pyuxd.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 13-Mar-85 21:04:02 EST
Article-I.D.: pyuxd.689
Posted: Wed Mar 13 21:04:02 1985
Date-Received: Thu, 14-Mar-85 06:26:27 EST
References: <835@wucs.UUCP>
Organization: Huxley College
Lines: 58

> > rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Professor Wagstaff) writes:
> > Are we going to do this again?  In recent discussions with Paul Torek,
> > I've been trying to explain that the concept of free will as it is
> > commonly defined DIRECTLY IMPLIES the notion of a soul or external agent.
>
> But it ain't so...  [PAUL TOREK]

> > To be truly *free* to make any "decision", the agent of choice MUST be
> > outside of the realm of cause and effect, external to the physiochemical
> > makeup of the brain and body.
>
> Wrong again!

This would seem to be the "argument by assertion" or the "because I say so"
style of reasoning.  C'mon, Paul!  You're just making assertions that my
point is wrong because you don't like it, but you offer nothing to either
show it to be wrong or to show the opposite (your point) to be true.  
Arndtian reasoning has no place here.

>>True freedom has nothing to do with rational evaluative capabilities.
>>True freedom would involve the ability to make decisions independent of
>>ANY external physical cause, INCLUDING the rational evaluative processes.
>>If one is truly free, one is truly free to choose either rationality or
>>irrationality at will, and not simply based on making a rational choice.

> Such a "choice" is the logical equivalent of a square circle.  The notion
> of choosing between rationality and irrationality involves the person in
> *representing* the options to himself.  But such a representation itself
> would already involve the use of reason.

It would seem this way only if you presume that reason is the only method of
making choices, which is a bogus assumption.

> And there could be no basis for such a choice, since reason must be used to
> see why the basis for choice justifies the choice.

Reason *must* be used only if reason *is* used.  (Sort of a cause and effect
reversal there.)  If one doesn't care whether or not one has made a
reasonable choice (an argument presented by religious believers who have said
to me: "Well I couldn't care less what your evidence against this is, I *still*
believe it, despite the logical reason to stop doing so!"), then one is not
obliged to use reason to make choices.

> The fact that Rich's definition of free will leads to such absurdities
> shows that it should be rejected.

Yes, indeed.  The definition, when analyzed closely (something Paul has
repeatedly chastised me about :-), shows many such absurdities.  And you're
right, it should be rejected.  And since that definition (not yours) would
seem to be the commonly accepted definition of what free will "is", you have
just claimed that the very notion of free will should be rejected.  Can we go
home now?

Again, as Schopenhauer said:  "A man can do what he wants to, but he cannot
want what he wants to."
-- 
Anything's possible, but only a few things actually happen.
					Rich Rosen    pyuxd!rlr