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From: mjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly)
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: poll  (nuclear disarmament verifiability)
Message-ID: <631@tty3b.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 13-Mar-85 13:08:21 EST
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Posted: Wed Mar 13 13:08:21 1985
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 >From: rohn@randvax.UUCP (Laurinda Rohn)
 >
 >Unfortunately, not all satellites can see through concrete buildings.
 >Things which are small enough *can* be hidden.
 >
 >Both sides know [the holdings of the other side] because ICBMs are 
 >very difficult to hide.  And said
 >info was obtained *NOT* by on-site inspection but by recon satellites.
 >The Soviets are quite reluctant to allow on-site inspections.

My point was that treaties which are negotiated include the means of
verification.  Neither side is willing to negotiate a treaty that doesn't
include whatever verification means are necessary.   If, as you claim,
cruise missiles absolutely cannot be verified, then they will not be covered
by an arms control treaty.  I think that these smaller weapons present a
problem for verification, and that must be addressed.  Hopefully, it can
be solved.  However, the fact that there are some areas that treaties cannot
cover just now is not an argument against arms control.  It simply restricts
what types of weapons can be negotiated.  Furthermore, verification needn't
be 100% reliable to be effective.  It may well be that the risks of some small
violations going undetected is less than the risk of having no limitations
whatever.  The point is not to negotiate a treaty that is absolutely, positively
verifiable, but to reduce the risk of nuclear holocaust.  

I personally think this whole on-site inspection argument is used as a 
red herring by some people who simply oppose arms control.   The Soviets have
clearly stated that they are willing to consider on-site inspection, but only
for significant gains in disarmament.  In other words, they aren't going to
allow on-site inspection unless the treaty including it is a significant
step forward.   This, in Reagan's terms, is a "bargaining chip."  I also
pointed out in a previous submission that it is not only the Soviets who
oppose on-site inspection.  As you can well imagine, there are some in the
U.S. military who aren't too crazy about having the Soviets march through
our own installations.

The issue, as Tim Severner very aptly raised it, is are you willing to take
risks only in the form of a build-up?  Are the risks inherent in building
new weapons systems acceptable no matter what, while the risks of negotiating
limits unacceptable?  

Mike Kelly