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From: orb@whuxl.UUCP (SEVENER)
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: Re: poll  (nuclear disarmament verifiability)
Message-ID: <520@whuxl.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 14-Mar-85 09:02:52 EST
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Posted: Thu Mar 14 09:02:52 1985
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There is a very good article in the latest Scientific American which discusses
the verifiability question and points out the various means which do
exist for both sides to verify arms agreements.  In the first place of course
are our satellites which can literally read a license plate.  These can be
very effective during daylight and clear conditions.  But the article also
points out that during cloudy or dark conditions there are radar facilities
which do not have the resolution of visible light satellites but can
observe larger objects.  There are also satellites which can observe the
infrared spectrum which complements the visible light and radio wave spectrums.
 
Also in terms of underground nuclear tests, these can be distinguished from
earthquakes and other normal seismic disturbances by concentrating on higher
frequency seismic waves which can only be generated by a point explosion
(such as a nuclear test) and which are not generated by earthquakes.
These seismic stations can observe any explosions over a kiloton.
As the article points out the smallest Soviet warhead is many times that
amount.  So there would not be much gained if the Soviets were to violate
a total test ban by testing explosions of about a kiloton-to develop warheads
of that size would be much smaller than anything they already have.
The article also points out that verifying a total ban on a category of weapon
is much easier than verifying compliance with a numerical limit.
(which is one reason that people like Wm Colby, former director of the CIA under
Nixon, have said the Freeze would be *easier* to verify than other arms
agreements)
In the case of a total ban on all ballistic missile tests this article estimates
there is over a 90% probability of detecting even a single ballistic missile
test.
The hardest thing to estimate is the accuracy of weapons being tested.  Althoughtheir trajectory can be plotted with great accuracy there is no way to know
where the missile was being aimed.
The article points out that Soviet encryption of telemetric data may obscure
some information about their tests( this has been a major "violation" pointed
to by Reagan and others), it is still possible to track these missile test
with great accuracy and gain much other information.
The article doesn't point out also that a joint report by the Joint Chiefs of
Staff, State Dept., and Defense Dept. in 1981 examined the accusation of
encryption of telemetric data from Soviet missile tests and the US did not
make a big issue of it in the SCC (Standing Consultative Committee)
partly because it would reveal the degree to which the US could already
unscramble such encrypted data.  Knowing the degree of American unscrambling
ability would have implications in other fields (diplomatic cables and so
forth) besides just missile tests and so past Administrations preferred not
to even present the issue.  
The Reagan administration's primary reason to raise the issue is political.
I would suggest those interested in the problem of verifiability read this
article.
                tim sevener    whuxl!orb