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From: mjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly)
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: poll  (nuclear disarmament verifiability)
Message-ID: <634@tty3b.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 18-Mar-85 09:54:20 EST
Article-I.D.: tty3b.634
Posted: Mon Mar 18 09:54:20 1985
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 >From: medin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin)
 >And even if we suspected them of [violations], what would we do, yell at them
 >at the SCC?  Big deal.  

Arms control is based on the notion that both sides agree to treaties that
are in their interests.  For some reason, there seems to be a notion afoot that
agreeing to limit arms automatically implies a concession of weakness, that
strength can come only from building more weapons.  That is silly.  If we can
agree that negotiating limitations can be in both sides interests, then it
follows that complying with negotiated treaties is in both sides interest.  The
argument here is that failing to abide by a negotiated treaty undermines future
negotiations that presumably would be in the nation's interest.   Thus, failing
to abide by a treaty in the long run undermines your own national interest.
This may sound rather theoretical, but it works quite well in practice.  The
evidence of this is statements by our own Defense and State Departments that
Soviet compliance with arms treaties has been good.  

Now the Standing Consultative Committee (SCC) is not an enforcement agency.
It is a body  set up by the treaty
to allow arbitration of charges and countercharges.  As Milo Medin probably
knows quite well, treaties are complex documents, and there is often disagreement
over what constitutes a violation.  The SCC is the body that arbitrates such
disagreements.  Of course, it's decisions aren't binding -- how could they be?
It has no nuclear weapons to brandish.  But, if an SCC decision is not followed,
a serious break in the treaty is precipitated and other sanctions probably
follow.  At the least, it would undermine support for arms control in this
country, if it were a Soviet violation.  Were it a U.S. violation, chances are
the Kremlin would be much less likely to negotiate with us.  

So it is rather facile to imply that the SCC is nothing but a meaningless
debating society.  Its pronouncements carry real weight, and there are examples
of cases where the SCC has caused the Soviets to end construction on projects
deemed a violation.

 >I remember some arms control proponent talking about cruise missiles
 >they other day.  He was saying that if we don't sign a treaty
 >banning cruise missiles now, we never could because they aren't
 >erifiable.  How's that for logic?

I guess that arms control proponent is me.  My point was that it is much easier
to control nuclear arms projects early in development than it is once they've
reached the deployment stage.  It may already be too late for GLCM's in this
instance.  However, SLCM's can still be caught in the testing stage and limits
negotiated before deployment starts.  Once deployment starts, the verification
problems are much harder.

I disagree that we are "beyond verification".   If your requirement is 100%
reliable verification, then we've always been beyond verification and arms
control is impossible.  I think most people who want 100% verifiablity actually
want 0% arms control. 

Mike Kelly