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From: mjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly)
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: poll  (nuclear disarmament verifiability)
Message-ID: <639@tty3b.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 20-Mar-85 11:14:06 EST
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Posted: Wed Mar 20 11:14:06 1985
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 >From: js2j@mhuxt.UUCP (sonntag)
 >Disarming without
 >100% verifiability entails a risk that one or both of the governments involved
 >will seize the chance to blow the other away.  

The reason that 100% verifiability isn't needed is that not every violation is
significant.  In most cases, minor violations may go undetected -- thus 
verifiability isn't 100% -- but these will not significantly alter the balance
of power.  Thus, the risks of these undetected violations are worth the overall
restrictions placed by the treaty.  It isn't true that any violation puts the
other side at the risk of being "blown away" -- at least, not any more so than
is already the case every second.


 >    You seem to be of the opinion that 100% verifiability is impossible to
 >even approximate.  Why? 

I don't believe in 100% anything.  Maybe we can achieve it; we should strive
for it.  I'm simply pointing out that some of those who claim they want 100%
verifiability use that as an excuse for simply opposing arms control.
 
 >If you said: 'Let's stop this foolishness and put our guns down.  But first,
 >remove your screen, so that I can see whether or not you are really putting
 >yours down.'  and they said: 'No way.  You'll just have to trust me.' 
 >would *you* trust them?  Would you trust them, if it was not just your life
 >you were risking, but the lives of us all?

One confusion here is that the U.S. is always willing to agree to any
verification means necessary and wants to achieve zero nuclear weapons, while
the Soviets are constructing roadblocks to this.  It ain't neccesarily so.
Both sides are responsible for putting up roadblocks.  It seems clear to me
that Reagan Administration policy in Geneva is to accept only proposals that
weaken the Soviets while enhancing U.S. strength.  That is not going to result
in an agreement.  You must realize that the highest officials in the arms control
agencies now have spent most of their political careers *opposing* arms control!
It is the proverbial fox-in-the-chicken-coop.  Now these are smart political
operators, and they realize they can't openly refuse to negotiate -- the U.S.
public will not put up with it.  So you're going to hear lots of arguments
about "bargaining chips" (if you can't pass a weapons system on its own
merits, simply trot out your arms control negotiators to swear that the Soviets
will be convinced we're a bunch of wimps unless we spend this $1.5 billion
or whatever)  and "verification".  All the hoopola about Soviet violations
last year was intended to poison the atmosphere for arms control.

There are legitimate concerns about verification, and I share them.  I live
in the U.S.,too, and I don't want to see us in any danger.  I simply think
that there are risks associated with building weapons and risks associated
with not building weapons.  In most cases, I'd rather take the latter risks
unless it seems inordinate.  

Mike Kelly