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From: orb@whuxl.UUCP (SEVENER)
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: Re: poll  (nuclear disarmament verifiability)
Message-ID: <529@whuxl.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 20-Mar-85 18:12:01 EST
Article-I.D.: whuxl.529
Posted: Wed Mar 20 18:12:01 1985
Date-Received: Thu, 21-Mar-85 04:47:00 EST
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> More inaccuracies from Milo "the Mad Bomber" Milo!!: 
> 
> I want 100% verifiablity, because treaties shouldn't be based
> on trust and the good will of the other side.  Because 100%
> verifiability is impossible for us, I reject arms control treaties.
 
Unfortunately our survival to this point is based on a certain degree
of trust in the rationality of the Soviets.  If they wanted they could
have launched a nuclear attack years ago.  And we would all be dead.
And given an allout attack by the Soviets (which involves over
5,000 megatons) even if we did not counterattack with a single weapon
they would all be dead or in very poor condition themselves.
Because 5,000 megatons is the point estimated to provoke a Nuclear
Winter.  We have no choice but to trust the Soviets are rational enough
not to commit mutual suicide.  If we assume the Soviets are mad
enough to desire mutual suicide then simply adding certainty to the
mutual suicide will not help whatsoever.  We may as well start preserving
the artifacts of our civilization now to prepare for the holocaust.
> 
> And what's so great about arms control treaties? b We wouldn't have this
> first strike problem without MIRV's, and because SALT treaties
> count launchers not warheads, its a great encouragement for
> everyone to MIRV!  Now you say, you see, its folks like you
> and other hawks who refused to ban MIRV back in SALT I.  And
> I admit to that, because you can't verify things like numbers
> of warheads.  
 
Your conclusion is right: if Nixon and Kissinger would have
negotiated limits on MIRVed weapons in SALT I we *would* be better off.
Your premise is faulty however; there are ways to verify numbers
of warheads by simply multiplying the number of launchers by the
number of warheads possible on a given missile.
  
More on this later,
          tim sevener   whuxl!orb