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From: mjk@tty3b.UUCP (Mike Kelly)
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Re: poll  (nuclear disarmament verifiability)
Message-ID: <643@tty3b.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 21-Mar-85 11:31:31 EST
Article-I.D.: tty3b.643
Posted: Thu Mar 21 11:31:31 1985
Date-Received: Fri, 22-Mar-85 02:42:29 EST
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 >From: medin@ucbvax.ARPA (Milo Medin)
 >The USSR can violate trre4aties
 >and the press calls it an 'ambiguity in the treaty', we propose
 >to do something similar, and they want Reagan's head on a platter...

Most of the so-called violations are simply rehashing old U.S. charges that
Presidents Nixon, Ford and Carter dealt with to their satisfaction in the
SCC.  For some reason, President Reagan refuses to use the SCC and prefers
to spread propaganda in the press.  I'll repeat this because it is very
relevant here.  In 1980, the Departments of Defense and State and the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency issued a joint statement that said,

	"Soviet compliance performance under 14 arms control
	 agreements signed since 1959 has been good."

The only substantive new charge since then has been the Soviet radar
installation at Krasnoyarsk.   Similar problems have been dealt with in
the SCC; Reagan refuses to do so.   The Soviets will not be embarassed
by the U.S. press and Reagan Administration propaganda to dismantle the
radar.  If the charge is serious -- and it appears to be -- it should be
addressed in the forum the treaty establishes to handle such charges.  The
Defense Department pointed out that both sides have raised questions
about each other's compliance with SALT I, and that "in each case the U.S.
has raised, the activity in question has either ceased or additional 
information has allayed our concern."  ("SALT and American Security: 
Questions Americans are Asking", GPO, November, 1979.)

To me, it is suspect when an Administration:

	(a) hires into ACDA people who have spent their political
		careers fighting *every* arms control treaty that
		has been negotiated;
	(b) spreads warmed-over rehashes of old charges through the
		press without pointing out that previous Administrations
		have had the charges resolved to their satisfaction;
	(c) goes into arms control negotiations talking about a "long
		process" that might not yield results for years;
	(d) uses those negotiations to pressure Congress into approving
		more and more weapons systems to use as "bargaining chips"
		(e.g. MX -- watch for SDI to be next);

I seriously wonder whether such an Administration is not simply staging
a large public relations facade.   I seriously wonder whether such an
Administration is not trying to dupe the American people, the majority of
whom support arms control, into thinking it does as well.

In the rest of his article, which I won't reproduce here, Milo offers a
convoluted argument about how SALT I is responsible for MIRVing of missiles.
This contradicts the record.  The U.S. MIRVed its missiles because Henry
Kissinger, then National Security Advisor, thought he could achieve a 
quick advantage.   The Soviets followed suit.  Kissinger later said: "I wish
I had thought through the consequences of MIRVing."   (paraphrase of
a quote in Seymour Hirsch's excellent book, "The Price of Power").   Like
most of the arms race, MIRVs were the result of a unilateral U.S. action.
The Soviets followed suit to keep pace.   That, after all, is what it's all
about.  That is what Milo offers us for the rest of our lives, and our children
for their lives.  That is his vision of the future.

Mike Kelly