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From: henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer)
Newsgroups: can.general,can.ai
Subject: Re: Star Wars analysis
Message-ID: <5407@utzoo.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 3-Apr-85 13:43:56 EST
Article-I.D.: utzoo.5407
Posted: Wed Apr  3 13:43:56 1985
Date-Received: Wed, 3-Apr-85 13:43:56 EST
References: <903@ubc-vision.CDN>
Organization: U of Toronto Zoology
Lines: 45

> In particular, you dismiss their assertions that we are inexorably moving
> towards "launch on warning" and the removal of human (read Presidential)
> decision making about starting nuclear war.

My mistake; I am aware of the suggestions that "launch on warning" will
be increasingly attractive due to steadily-reduced decision times.  What
I'd like to know is, what does "launch on warning" of offensive weapons
have to do with automatic initiation of defensive weapons?

> the Star Wars technology is only an effective deterrent if it
> can be used during the "boost phase" of the rising Russian missiles.

The Star Wars technology is a *defence*, not a *deterrent*.  These are
two very different animals.  A defence protects against an actual attack;
a deterrent attempts to avert attacks by frightening the opposition.
(By the way, some of the suggested SDI methods do not rely on boost-phase
interception, although it is the most attractive time to do it.)

> The 60-second decision time required NECESSITATES automatic decision making
> and automatic "nuclear war fighting".

I'm willing to go along with the first half, but not the second.  I see
no reason why initiation of defensive systems, i.e. SDI, need have anything
to do with initiation of offensive systems, i.e. nuclear weapons.  They
are two quite separate issues.  In fact, it has been suggested that SDI
would substantially increase the available decision time for launching
offensive weapons, since it would interfere severely with any attempt
to quickly destroy offensive systems.

I agree with your point that a technology is "safe" only if we can live
with occasional failures, although your example of nuclear power was
singularly ill-chosen, since accidental failures are generally less
dangerous there than almost anywhere else.  (Nuclear power plants are
better protected against accidents than almost any other technology,
including many that handle dangerous chemicals or explosive fuels
in large quantities.)  Clearly, however, an accidental failure in a
*defence* system is far less dangerous than an accidental failure in
a *deterrent* system.  SDI systems do not launch nuclear missiles;
they shoot down missiles that have already been launched by someone
else.  I repeat, the worst consequence of accidental initiation of an
SDI system is shooting down a manned space launch.  This would be
regrettable, but surely we can live with the risk.
-- 
				Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
				{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry