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From: lesperan@utai.UUCP (Yves Lesperance)
Newsgroups: can.general,can.ai
Subject: Re: Star Wars analysis
Message-ID: <410@utai.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 3-Apr-85 23:22:08 EST
Article-I.D.: utai.410
Posted: Wed Apr  3 23:22:08 1985
Date-Received: Thu, 4-Apr-85 00:41:47 EST
References: <903@ubc-vision.CDN> <5407@utzoo.UUCP>
Organization: CSRI, University of Toronto
Lines: 50
Xref: utai can.general:70 can.ai:49

In <5407@utzoo.UUCP>, Henry Spencer says:
>My mistake; I am aware of the suggestions that "launch on warning" will
>be increasingly attractive due to steadily-reduced decision times.  What
>I'd like to know is, what does "launch on warning" of offensive weapons
>have to do with automatic initiation of defensive weapons?
> ... I see no reason why initiation of defensive systems, i.e. SDI, need
>have anything to do with initiation of offensive systems, i.e. nuclear
>weapons. ...  SDI systems do not launch nuclear missiles;
>they shoot down missiles that have already been launched by someone
>else.  I repeat, the worst consequence of accidental initiation of an
>SDI system is shooting down a manned space launch.  This would be
>regrettable, but surely we can live with the risk.

This ignores the fact that offensive and defensive systems are likely
to be linked in their operation.  Moreover the opponent's perception of
threat is based on the characteristics of the combined system.

Consider the following senario: assume that both superpowers have
SDI-type systems together with all the surveillance hardware that is
necessary to make them work. The US system goes on alert as a result of
some situation that was not anticipated in the system design; these
false alarms are said to happen on a daily basis in current systems.
The Soviet system gets reports of the US system going on alert and reacts
by doing the same. This leads the US system to go on a higher level of alert,
and so on.  At some point the US system, which must make a decision while
the incoming missiles are still in boost phase, that is in about one minute,
decides to fire at the percieved missiles and maybe also at the Soviet
surveillance satellites.  All this may happen with next to no human 
involvement due to the short decision time.

Now the Soviets know that the SDI system is poor protection against a first
strike, but could work well against a second strike. They take the
US action as the beginning of an attack (with good evidence), and so they
fire their missiles.

I view this kind of scenario as very plausible.  The recent changes in the
nuclear scene, that is, cruise missiles, short and medium range missiles,
and stealth technology, have all decreased decision times and increased
uncertainty; they have done nothing to increase our security.  SDI will
extend this mad trend.  Because of these changes, our destiny will be put
in the hands of ``expert'' computer systems. The Strategic Computing
Initiative document makes clear that this is why they want these AI defence
systems although it is less candid as to where the technology will be used.
But nobody knows how to program common-sense either now or for the forseeable
future.  So the ``expert'' systems will follow their rigid rules to their
very end, as well as ours.

Yves Lesperance

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