Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP
Posting-Version: version B 2.10 beta 3/9/83; site aquila.UUCP
Path: utzoo!dciem!aquila!chris
From: chris@aquila.UUCP (chris)
Newsgroups: can.general
Subject: Re: Star Wars analysis
Message-ID: <9@aquila.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 4-Apr-85 11:44:58 EST
Article-I.D.: aquila.9
Posted: Thu Apr  4 11:44:58 1985
Date-Received: Thu, 4-Apr-85 14:33:12 EST
References: <410@utai.UUCP>
Organization: Consensys Corporation.
Lines: 39

<< in reference to Yves Lesperance's rebuttal >>
In my own opinion, and agreeing with Henry's, accidental SDI initiation
is not threatening by itself.  However, Yves has raised an important concern;
that if SDI is linked to offensive systems, then the chance of accidental
war may be increased.

However, the issue appears complicated by one other factor: namely, the
development of counter-force technology (so-called because it acts against
other forces of attack, as compared to MAD's counter-value technology
that acts against cities and people). The genie is out of the bottle;
who can push it back in? Yves mentions stealth bombers, cruise missles,
and new mid-range ballistic missles; these are all weapons that make
a preemptory first-strike possible, and bring about the dangers of
'launch-on-warning'. Even submarines are not invulnerable; it is anticipated
that satellite submarine detectors are possible within 10 years, allowing
the use of nuclear depth charges before a first strike to knock off all
SLBMs before use.

This is an exceedingly frightening scenario, but it is the world we live
in. Military thinking must take into account worst-case scenarios
when designing effective responses; this leads often to overkill situations.
(Remember the dreadnaughts arms race prior to 1914?) We can research
social interactions till the cows come home, but we will never be able
to avoid human conflict.

SDI offers the hope that defensive systems will deter the new first-strike
systems by threatening them enroute; deter a first-strike by protecting
silos for a possible second-strike (thus removing the impetus for a preemptory
strike), and finally (just maybe) save a few million people in case the
unthinkable happens. In this way, SDI re-balances the MAD strategy, by
countering the new technologies that destabilize MAD. The status quo
can be preserved.

Beyond that, it is very nice to dream. A truly effective defence system
may in fact lead to the end of MAD, and allow a true offensive build-down.
Even if Mutual Assured Survival (MAS) never does replace MAD, however,
the SDI is necessary to keep MAD working.

	Chris Retterath		(..utzoo!dciem!aquila!chris)