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From: henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer)
Newsgroups: can.general
Subject: Re: Star Wars...for the record
Message-ID: <5421@utzoo.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 4-Apr-85 17:40:28 EST
Article-I.D.: utzoo.5421
Posted: Thu Apr  4 17:40:28 1985
Date-Received: Thu, 4-Apr-85 17:40:28 EST
References: <907@ubc-vision.CDN>
Organization: U of Toronto Zoology
Lines: 61

> - (less important of the two...)  How long will it take to get an
>   operational "SDI system" up there?  If and when it happens (God
>   forbid...) what sort of reaction times will we be looking at for
>   various weapons systems? (since the development of offensive sys-
>   tems is not likely to stand still until that umbrella becomes a
>   reality)  Given the trend right now, it seems that they will be 
>   short and will involve control by computers...possibly to full
>   "launch on warning".

Unsettlingly plausible.  But this will happen regardless of SDI.
SDI might even help avert this, since even a rather leaky SDI system
makes it *very* hard for an opponent to be sure that he can knock
out offensive systems underneath.

>   It seems reasonable to assume that control
>   systems for an SDI defensive system will end up talking to the
>   control systems for offensive weapons to provide for a "compre-
>   hensive command and control system".  I don't see that we should
>   discount the possibility of a bug in SDI starting a catastrophy.

You are assuming that *nobody* planning these systems has thought of
that.  The reason why none of the much-publicized "false alarms" in
recent history has come anywhere near starting a nuclear war is that
the people designing command-and-control systems for nuclear weapons
have been quite paranoid about this sort of thing.  I fail to see why
an SDI system's "we are under attack" signal will be taken at face
value, when nothing else ever is in these systems.

> - (more important of the two...)  SDI promises to be dangerously
> destabilizing long before it becomes operational.

Unfortunately true.  But this isn't fundamentally unsolvable; one possible
way is to link SDI deployment with major offensive-arms reductions.  I'm
not saying I have a complete solution to the problem, but it's not an
inherent impossibility.

> It also will
>   distract resources (funds, human talent and labour) from projects
>   which *could* lead to a more stable future.

You mean, it will mobilize resources which -- IF MOBILIZED -- could do
better things instead.  Don't make the mistake made by the planetary
scientists who were opposed to Apollo:  they said "cut Apollo, for the
money is better spent on us"; what they got, eventually, was budget
cuts in Apollo *and* in their projects.  Just because resources are not
being used on project X, don't assume they will be used on Y.  I think
it far more likely that money not spent on SDI will be spent on worse
things, like yet more nuclear weapons.

>   For the record...have YOU, Henry, signed Ray Reiter's Declaration 
>   and are YOU promoting it?...please do!

For the record, NO, because I think he's wrong.  Or at least, not
obviously right.  There is much wrong with the way SDI is currently
being tackled, and this worries me, but unconditional opposition strikes
me as inappropriate.  Especially when MAD gets more dangerous every year,
and there is little evidence of any real progress on pleasant dreams like
large-scale disarmament.
-- 
				Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology
				{allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry