Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site ames.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!unc!mcnc!philabs!cmcl2!seismo!hao!ames!barry From: barry@ames.UUCP (Kenn Barry) Newsgroups: net.religion,net.religion.jewish,net.religion.christian Subject: Re: Logic based on different sets of assumptions (start again...) Message-ID: <936@ames.UUCP> Date: Mon, 15-Apr-85 13:57:55 EST Article-I.D.: ames.936 Posted: Mon Apr 15 13:57:55 1985 Date-Received: Wed, 17-Apr-85 01:00:57 EST References: <886@pyuxd.UUCP> Organization: NASA-Ames Research Center, Mtn. View, CA Lines: 160 Xref: watmath net.religion:6658 net.religion.jewish:1822 net.religion.christian:639 Rich, I actually agree with most of what you say when applied to the kind of religion you seem to have had in mind when you wrote your article. The point of the rebuttal I make below is that the question of the existence of God/gods is not seen as a simple either/or question by everyone. If you feel what follows strays from the issues you were raising, you're probably right, but it seemed worth posting, anyway. From pyuxd!rlr (Rich Rosen): >Since there is no hard evidence to support the existence of a deity or, for >that matter, of any so-called "supernatural" entity, one would normally work >(in a typical analysis of a non-religious oriented phenomena) from the >assumption that the thing for which there is no evidence does not exist. >Without evidence showing verifiable evidence of a thing's existence, or its >observed effect on the "physical" world, via Occam people would generally >assume that it does not exist until evidence of a viable nature presents >itself. The *possibility* that it may exist is left open, but such a >possibility evinces itself if and only if evidence is presented to support >it. Seems to me you have some assumptions about "deity" built into your argument which do not hold true for all deities. When one is specifically discussing an *external* deity who is able to influence the material world in mysterious ways, then your argument applies; this, however, is not the only possible conception of "deity". If I am unconcerned about whether my experience of god has to do with a being whose existence and powers are independent of my consciousness, then I think your argument fails. I can agree that my "religious" experience can be explained solely in terms of brain chemistry, and does not constitute evidence for an external deity; yet still claim that the experience is meaningful because it enriches my understanding of the perceivable world. If neither of us feel that logic and mathematics are invalid because they are carried out via brain chemistry, why should brain chemistry invalidate religious experience? My conception of religious experience (i.e., my way of understanding it, not necessarily The Truth) is that it involves perceiving reality through fewer layers of mental "filter", bypassing analysis and preconception and objectification. We cannot know reality directly; our senses and preconscious, lower-level brain functions are always participants in the creation of what we perceive. But I think there can be times when we meet reality through the lowest possible number of intervening curtains, and it is these experiences which we call "mystical". Because such experiences bypass the rational, cognitive levels of filter, they are not expressible in everyday terms. Like dreams, they present an ordering of reality which ill-fits the dialectic strictures of human language. When expression of such ideas is attempted (as I'm doing now), distortions of the pristine experience are unavoidable. >However, obviously some people do believe in the existence of deities and >other forms of the so-called supernatural despite the lack of realistic >evidence. One can only assume that 1) these people have a different set of >criteria for acceptability of evidence, and/or 2) they have some vested >interest in believing that particular outcome of analysis that they believe >to be true. Quite possibly both. I think we have shown endless times that >the nature of the subjective evidence offered in favor of religious belief >is tainted: How come your subjectivity shows a different world view than >someone else's? Which one is right? WHY is his/hers wrong and YOURS right? >If he/she is being deceived, how can you be sure it is not YOU who has been >deceived? (Not to mention the way the brain is known to impose patterns >onto events/phenomena/ observations that upon closer examination are shown >to be quite wrong---like "recognizing" someone at the airport and realizing >that it wasn't them after all.) I think the above paragraph makes two assumptions about believers in deities which are not always true of them. The first is that all believers in deities would make claims which are testable in theory. If someone, a Deist or pantheist perhaps, claimed that there can be no physical evidence for their claims, because no claims were being *made* about the workings of physical reality, then the lack of objective evidence for their claim is *part* of their claim, and does not argue against it. The second assumption is that all theists assert that their claims are the only correct ones, and those of other theists, mistaken. While this is true of some religions, and even common among Christian sects, it is far from universally true. Not all religions are exclusivist; some conceive of the various creeds as different paths to the same destination. >These assumptions are not >confined to religions (or, if you prefer, theistic religions). The belief >in so-called "supernatural" phenomena of all sorts stems from the same sort >of presumptions. For example, when statements are made about the >similarities between experiences of "mystics" of different belief systems, >this is cited as "evidence" that there is a supernatural force behind them, >rather than the more likely rational possibilities centering on simple human >psychology and biochemistry---the "physical" realm that some people would >claim that these experiences are (a priori) not a part of. (Again, the >question always left unanswered: what is meant by "non-physical" or >"supernatural", if not "beyond that which humans can perceive"?) Well, I, for one, don't assert *anything* supernatural, yet I'd still describe some of my ideas as "mystical". And if I choose to believe there are meaningful aspects of reality which are beyond my ability to apprehend rationally, this is not meant to gainsay materialism, but to augment it. Is it irrational for me to believe that the universe may have subtleties that cannot be fully analyzed and understood in strictly Aristotelian terms? Even if I accept your apparent assertion that the universe is mechanistic and "natural" in its operations, I have no guarantee that my main tool for dealing with reality (a human consciousness using the limited rational tools of human consciousness) is sufficient for a complete understanding of What's Going On. Speaking for myself, I find I need a meta-framwork in which to embed my materialism. The picture of reality we receive through our senses is inevitably highly incomplete. It is local, it is filtered through less than perfect sensory equipment, and it is filtered through preconceptions we have learned so thoroughly that we're hardly even aware of their existence. The essential claim of the mystic, as I understand it, is to have had a more direct experience of reality than this. Must such a claim be considered "supernatural", a priori? Or is it that the thoroughgoing materialist may *assume* that a supernatural claim is being made, because their preconceptions of what is "religious" includes supernaturalism? I understand that your remarks were only directed at those making supernatural claims; my point is that it may not always be clear if claims *are* supernatural. >Thus my question is: why DO you presume the existence of god/the >supernatural as a given (obviously I and many others simply do not), if not >because you have some vested interest in believing that it is so, what I >have endlessly and perhaps monotonously labelled as WISHFUL THINKING? (From >here on in, please assume that phrases akin to "existence of god" refer to >"existence of any presumed supernatural phenomena".) To the extent that I understand your use of the terms "god" and "supernatural", I would have to say that I do not believe in such things, though I try to keep an open mind. There are some who would describe my beliefs as theistic, however, and that's OK, too. The point I'm trying to make is that you assume too much even about those whom you *would* consider theistic. Not all such people use their beliefs as their source for understanding physical phenomena. If anything, it's the moral dimension of existence which is most relevant to religious belief. In any case, your real grievance seems to be against those who would give over their power to make moral decisions to some higher authority, be it god, government, or gurus. >The conflict comes into play where "existence of god" assumptions >(compounded by assumptions about what IS "god's word" and who is qualified >to be god's authority representative on earth) are contradicted by rational >inquisitive analysis and investigation of the world itself, or by individual >human needs (arbitrarily?) denied/forbidden/not met by "god's word". Those >who make such assumptions may deny the claims of the investigators (in >"protest") solely because the claims would force them to change their whole >view of the universe based on the evidence. If those people are in >positions of earthly authority, we may witness repression of such ideas, and >of people who hold them. We HAVE witnessed such repression in the past, and >we may be witnessing it again today. Some belief systems that include >notions of supernatural phenomena and even deities do not fit this mold. I >am specifically talking about those that do. And some belief systems that *don't* incorporate supernatural assumptions, *do* fit the mold. The evils you describe above seem to occur whenever the group in power believe that they know what's best for everyone. Many groups which do not meet your definition of religion, such as Communists and Nazis, share this conviction of utter rightness, and act accordingly. If your purpose is to warn of the dangers of being a True Believer, you can sign me up on your side right now. But the Will of God is only one of many excuses people have used for persecution of those they dislike. I share your dislike of those who would defend repression as "God's will", but I find it no more attractive when the defense is "historical imperative" or "manifest destiny" or "the will of the people". It's all a cop-out. - From the Crow's Nest - Kenn Barry NASA-Ames Research Center Moffett Field, CA ------------------------------------------------------------------------------- USENET: {ihnp4,vortex,dual,hao,menlo70,hplabs}!ames!barry