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From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Dr. Emmanuel Wu)
Newsgroups: net.religion,net.religion.jewish,net.religion.christian
Subject: Re: Logic based on different sets of assumptions (start again...)
Message-ID: <911@pyuxd.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 18-Apr-85 17:30:12 EST
Article-I.D.: pyuxd.911
Posted: Thu Apr 18 17:30:12 1985
Date-Received: Fri, 19-Apr-85 01:27:13 EST
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> 	Seems to me you have some assumptions about "deity" built into your
> argument which do not hold true for all deities. When one is specifically
> discussing an *external* deity who is able to influence the material world in
> mysterious ways, then your argument applies; this, however, is not the only
> possible conception of "deity". If I am unconcerned about whether my
> experience of god has to do with a being whose existence and powers are
> independent of my consciousness, then I think your argument fails. I can agree
> that my "religious" experience can be explained solely in terms of brain
> chemistry, and does not constitute evidence for an external deity; yet still
> claim that the experience is meaningful because it enriches my understanding
> of the perceivable world. If neither of us feel that logic and mathematics are
> invalid because they are carried out via brain chemistry, why should brain
> chemistry invalidate religious experience? [KENN BARRY]

If, by "internal (as opposed to external) deity", you mean some sort of
self-determiner evincing free will, the same things really do apply.  See
my discussions with Ms. Creighton on the subject.

> 	My conception of religious experience (i.e., my way of understanding
> it, not necessarily The Truth) is that it involves perceiving reality through
> fewer layers of mental "filter", bypassing analysis and preconception and
> objectification. We cannot know reality directly; our senses and preconscious,
> lower-level brain functions are always participants in the creation of what we
> perceive. But I think there can be times when we meet reality through the
> lowest possible number of intervening curtains, and it is these experiences
> which we call "mystical".

It would seem just the opposite to me:  such experiences would seem to have
even more additional intervening preconceptive curtains, not fewer.

>>However, obviously some people do believe in the existence of deities and
>>other forms of the so-called supernatural despite the lack of realistic
>>evidence.  One can only assume that 1) these people have a different set of
>>criteria for acceptability of evidence, and/or 2) they have some vested
>>interest in believing that particular outcome of analysis that they believe
>>to be true.  Quite possibly both.  I think we have shown endless times that
>>the nature of the subjective evidence offered in favor of religious belief
>>is tainted:  How come your subjectivity shows a different world view than
>>someone else's?  Which one is right?  WHY is his/hers wrong and YOURS right?
>>If he/she is being deceived, how can you be sure it is not YOU who has been
>>deceived?  (Not to mention the way the brain is known to impose patterns
>>onto events/phenomena/ observations that upon closer examination are shown
>>to be quite wrong---like "recognizing" someone at the airport and realizing
>>that it wasn't them after all.)

> 	I think the above paragraph makes two assumptions about believers in
> deities which are not always true of them. The first is that all believers in
> deities would make claims which are testable in theory. If someone, a Deist or
> pantheist perhaps, claimed that there can be no physical evidence for their
> claims, because no claims were being *made* about the workings of physical
> reality, then the lack of objective evidence for their claim is *part* of
> their claim, and does not argue against it.

Nor does it offer support---it merely makes it into nothing BUT a claim.
They would claim "no physical evidence", yet their own physical bodies (their
brains at least) are affected).  By a "mystical source", or by their own
imposition of interpretation on their physical experience?

> 	The second assumption is that all theists assert that their claims are
> the only correct ones, and those of other theists, mistaken. While this
> is true of some religions, and even common among Christian sects, it is
> far from universally true. Not all religions are exclusivist; some conceive
> of the various creeds as different paths to the same destination.

Yes, I know.  This doesn't change the nature of subjectivity, though.

>>These assumptions are not
>>confined to religions (or, if you prefer, theistic religions).  The belief
>>in so-called "supernatural" phenomena of all sorts stems from the same sort
>>of presumptions.  For example, when statements are made about the
>>similarities between experiences of "mystics" of different belief systems,
>>this is cited as "evidence" that there is a supernatural force behind them,
>>rather than the more likely rational possibilities centering on simple human
>>psychology and biochemistry---the "physical" realm that some people would
>>claim that these experiences are (a priori) not a part of.  (Again, the
>>question always left unanswered:  what is meant by "non-physical" or
>>"supernatural", if not "beyond that which humans can perceive"?)

> 	Well, I, for one, don't assert *anything* supernatural, yet I'd still
> describe some of my ideas as "mystical". And if I choose to believe there are
> meaningful aspects of reality which are beyond my ability to apprehend
> rationally, this is not meant to gainsay materialism, but to augment it. Is it
> irrational for me to believe that the universe may have subtleties that cannot
> be fully analyzed and understood in strictly Aristotelian terms?

What does it mean to "augment materialism"?  Are you adding things to the
"lists" of things that ARE existing beyond those listed as "material"?  Why
weren't they in the list of "material" things?  Because we couldn't perceive
them?  Be careful what you're leaping into here.

> 	The picture of reality we receive through our senses is inevitably
> highly incomplete. It is local, it is filtered through less than perfect
> sensory equipment, and it is filtered through preconceptions we have learned
> so thoroughly that we're hardly even aware of their existence. The essential
> claim of the mystic, as I understand it, is to have had a more direct
> experience of reality than this. Must such a claim be considered
> "supernatural", a priori? Or is it that the thoroughgoing materialist may
> *assume* that a supernatural claim is being made, because their preconceptions
> of what is "religious" includes supernaturalism? I understand that your
> remarks were only directed at those making supernatural claims; my point
> is that it may not always be clear if claims *are* supernatural.
 
Good point.  Still, we must distinguish between your presumption that those
people are somehow closer (fewer intervening layers) to reality, and mine
(yes, it's a presumption, though I think a far more reasonable one) that they
are further (more layers) because they add in their preconceptions.

>>The conflict comes into play where "existence of god" assumptions
>>(compounded by assumptions about what IS "god's word" and who is qualified
>>to be god's authority representative on earth) are contradicted by rational
>>inquisitive analysis and investigation of the world itself, or by individual
>>human needs (arbitrarily?) denied/forbidden/not met by "god's word".  Those
>>who make such assumptions may deny the claims of the investigators (in
>>"protest") solely because the claims would force them to change their whole
>>view of the universe based on the evidence.  If those people are in
>>positions of earthly authority, we may witness repression of such ideas, and
>>of people who hold them.  We HAVE witnessed such repression in the past, and
>>we may be witnessing it again today.  Some belief systems that include
>>notions of supernatural phenomena and even deities do not fit this mold.  I
>>am specifically talking about those that do.

> 	And some belief systems that *don't* incorporate supernatural
> assumptions, *do* fit the mold. The evils you describe above seem to occur
> whenever the group in power believe that they know what's best for everyone.
> Many groups which do not meet your definition of religion, such as Communists
> and Nazis, share this conviction of utter rightness, and act accordingly. If
> your purpose is to warn of the dangers of being a True Believer, you can sign
> me up on your side right now. But the Will of God is only one of many excuses
> people have used for persecution of those they dislike. I share your dislike
> of those who would defend repression as "God's will", but I find it no more
> attractive when the defense is "historical imperative" or "manifest destiny"
> or "the will of the people". It's all a cop-out.

Yes, it's but one of a number of "techniques" and excuses.  You'll find though
that such excuses are more often than not TIGHTLY COUPLED with "god".  (Why
is it our manifest destiny?  Because God said so!---or go back and read Don
Black if you need further clues)  Maybe such people who have inferiority
complex problems that lead them to make such claims about manifest destiny
and such will find some other excuse in the absence of a belief in a god.
Removing this avenue and showing it for what it is will at least remove IT
from the pool of excuses.  Without the ability to claim that it's "willed
by god", where would they turn?
-- 
Otology recapitulates phonology.
					Rich Rosen    ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr