Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site cbscc.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxr!mhuxt!houxm!ihnp4!cbosgd!cbsck!cbscc!pmd From: pmd@cbscc.UUCP (Paul Dubuc) Newsgroups: net.religion Subject: Re: Hitler and Moral Relativism Message-ID: <5200@cbscc.UUCP> Date: Thu, 25-Apr-85 00:00:25 EST Article-I.D.: cbscc.5200 Posted: Thu Apr 25 00:00:25 1985 Date-Received: Thu, 25-Apr-85 08:33:00 EST References: <5178@cbscc.UUCP>, <504@mcnc.mcnc.UUCP> Organization: AT&T Bell Laboratories , Columbus Lines: 167 Another response to Byron (probably my last on this topic): >>One question you're avoiding, Byron, is whether or not Hitler's actions, >>were moral. Do you think they were, while they were actually going on? >>Do you agree that to consider them moral after the fact (as in Muffy's >>hypothetical situation) does not make sense? If so, then the contention >>stands that moral relativism makes no binding judgement against a Hitler >>in any society. > >I wasn't aware that I was avoiding the question. For the record, I believe >Adolph Hitler's actions and policies to be anything but moral. I qualify >that by saying my judgement of what is moral and immoral is done on the >basis of cultural precepts I have internalized from living 40+ years in this >society. Without that (or some other) cultural envelope there is simply >no basis for judgement. OK, let me clarify. Can you make a binding judgement on Nazis or KKK members in *this* society? That is, apart from what you believe, do you have justification for saying that holding their racist ideologies and acting according to them is wrong? If you saw one of these folks about to kill a Black person, you would object according to your own culturally defined beliefs and say that you believe that the would be killer is wrong. Fine. My point is that would that person then be able to snuff out your objection simply by saying, "That's just what you believe. Your culture has conditioned you that way and I don't particularly agree with the cultural morality. In fact, I'm in the process of redefining that morality so that it will accept what I believe to be right."? If your answer is "yes" then my last sentence in the first paragraph above still holds. If it is no, then I suggest that you are backing off from moral relativism. >Culture provides the filter through which history is viewed. As >culture changes, so perceptions of the "morality" or "immorality" of an >act changes. Consider the Hiroshima nuclear attack. In its time it >was considered a moral act. Today, among many in the U.S., there is >considerable doubt as to its morality. (Among Japanese, there is little >doubt as to its immorality.) I submit there are no binding judgements as >to any event, ever. As culture changes the definition of morality changes. In this example you're leaving out hindsight. We have that today. The U.S. didn't then. In fact, most people in the U.S. didn't know what an atomic bomb was, let alone the extent of what it could do. I don't even think that those who developed it and dropped it knew the full extent of what they were doing. To say that our culture approved of dropping the Bomb then, is misleading. >>You say the morality of an act depends on who is doing it. What about the >>*reasons* for doing each? Moral absolutes imply a common standard >>by which to judge each act. What common standard would you propose for >>considering whether each of these acts is moral or not? Do you pass >>judgement on either of them? How do you answer your own question? If >>you think both acts are immoral, what is the basis for that view, and >>what gives your view any real meaning? > >If you've been following my argument you know that I cannot propose a >standard for evaluation that is binding for all across time. I simply >took, for example, two cases of attempted genocide and asked why is one >of them considered moral and the other immoral? What *I* think is >irrelevant. I am asking *you* to show *me* the common standard. You >are the absolutist, remember, I am the relativist. And you have ignored what I said in the following paragraphs of that article. What is your basis of asking the question? You are implying a comparison of the two events and also that they are inconsistent. If you don't have a basis for that comparison than your question is meaningless. As a relativist you have no grounds for asking it. You asked why one is considered moral and the other immoral. Considered so by whom? Whose moral standard is contradicted here. I offered you three possible ones that I could think of. What you think must be relevant or your question is irrelevant. >>You are glad that we consider certain rights inalienable because it makes >>your life pleasant. Is that a reason why they should be considered as >>such? If not, can you give a reason? Members of the KKK and certain Neo-Nazi >>groups apparently don't think the inalienable rights we accord to certain >>groups make life pleasant. Wouldn't you have to see things from their >>point of view? If it turns out that we shouldn't consider these rights >>inalienable where do we stand? What gives us any right to draw the line >>of the KKK and the Nazis in *this* society? > >Paul, you are making the general mistake of believing that moral relativists >have no morality. I'll guarantee you I have a set of principles that I hold >absolutely as firmly as do you. If you have been following this discussion >you know that as well. No, I know you have a morality. >The difference would seem to be that I do not believe my standards apply to >everyone, of every species, at every place and every time. I do not believe >my standards to be Gd-given, but derived from my culture and my experience. >In another place and time they might well be different (but held absolutely >as firmly.) But I am talking about *this* culture, Byron. >We abridge rights regularly in this society. The culture provides rules >under which such sanctions can be invoked. These rules aren't always clear >and are often in flux, but they are there. The rights you speak of aren't >considered inalienable, even though the boilerplate says they are. The >notions of whether they should or shouldn't be are up for debate. That I >may be able to see things from the Nazi or the KKK point of view does not >mean I am compelled to agree with those points of view. Moral relativism >does *not* mean amorality. How many times do I have to repeat this? No, it doesn't mean the individual moral relativist is amoral, but I think it does have implications of amorality for society (even this one; right here and now). The KKK are not amoral either. You have your morality and they have theirs. If moral relativism were held to consistently, we could not justify preventing the KKK from carrying our their agenda in whatever way they see fit. I also feel like I've been repeating myself, Byron. >I agree with you that a moral standard, relative or absolute, describes >what ought to be within a given domain. The inconsistencies in the way >various historical events are viewed indicate, to me, that there are not >absolute principles of morality (please name some that are demonstrable!) >This does not deny the possibility of moral judgement within some more >restricted domain. In my last article I asked you what your basis for viewing these examples as inconsistent. If you don't have one then even your question is meaningless. How else is consistency supposed to be "demonstrable". It seems that you basis for moral relativism is in itself relative, which seems to me to make it meaningless. What domain can you consistently restrict your relative moral judgments to? Do they extend beyond yourself? >I hate to disillusion you, but the Civil War was fought over taxation, not >slavery. Slavery proved to be a good call to arms for northerners but to >be truthful it had begun to die of its own weight well before the Civil War. >This is more properly discussed in net.politics. Whose reason was taxation? If the slavery issue was needed as a call to arms, then taxation was not a sufficient reason to draw the states into conflict. Even the fact that slavery served as a good call to arms supports my point that there was moral reproach involved. If there wasn't the call to arms wouldn't have worked. >>Your main point seems to be that you find no evidence that those who hold >>to certain moral absolutes also recognize when their own actions fall short >>of that standard as well as when those of others do. This is not true, I >>think (except if you look among those who are already moral relativists). > >Not at all. I simply see no evidence for an absolute morality, but rather >I see the belief in an absolute morality allows people to believe the world >will not shortly become unhinged. In a previous article, you said: I submit that the morality of a particular act depends upon whether you are the actor or the one acted upon (or allies thereof.) If moral precepts were applied consistently throughout history by those who assert an "absolute morality" I could be persuaded that such a thing exists. I do not find such evidence, hence moral relativism. I have been trying to follow your argument, Byron. I'll have to admit it has not been easy. If your are going to talk about what is "consistent" you have to provide a basis by which you would consider things as such. I've been trying to get you to do that with the examples you have brought up. Your answer to that is to throw it back in my lap and say "I'm the moral relativist". Well, you point to certain perceived inconsistencies as evidence against moral absolutes, hence you are a moral relativist. When I ask "inconsistent with what?", you act like that question is irrelevant to you since you are a moral relativist. I give up. (It's getting late, anyway). -- Paul Dubuc cbscc!pmd