Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.1 6/24/83; site bnr-di.UUCP Path: utzoo!utcsri!utcs!bnr-vpa!bnr-di!yali From: yali@bnr-di.UUCP Newsgroups: can.general Subject: Re: Star Wars Message-ID: <132@bnr-di.UUCP> Date: Sat, 13-Apr-85 22:25:15 EST Article-I.D.: bnr-di.132 Posted: Sat Apr 13 22:25:15 1985 Date-Received: Sat, 13-Apr-85 04:01:15 EST References: <909@ubc-vision.CDN> <389@mnetor.UUCP> <1003@utcsri.UUCP>, <1014@utcsri.UUCP> Organization: DI, Bell-Northern Research, Ottawa, Ontario Lines: 24 In article 70 Tom West writes (in reference to the SDI): > Isn't much of this worry unfounded? Is there any indication that the system >is even going to work? > In my opinion, the only point is what the money would have been spent on >otherwise. Yes, serious technical questions have been raised as to the feasibility of the scheme. However, it is worth bearing in mind that in practice SDI may boil down to something that is less ambitious than the leakproof umbrella so grandiloquently described by President Reagan in his public announcement. More likely (i.e., feasible) is a system that is designed to protect a limited number of military targets, such as missile fields. Of course, such a system would work all the better in conjunction with a first-strike policy, since if a large proportion of the opposing side's missiles could be disabled in their silos a The potentially destabilizing effects of SDI have been catalogued by numerous commentators; for instance, see the article by Bundy, Kennan, McNamara, and Smith in the Winter 1984/85 issue of the journal Foreign Affairs.