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From: mjk@ttrdc.UUCP (Mike Kelly)
Newsgroups: net.politics
Subject: Is A First Strike Becoming Inescapable?
Message-ID: <147@ttrdc.UUCP>
Date: Tue, 23-Apr-85 12:49:29 EST
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Posted: Tue Apr 23 12:49:29 1985
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References: <123@ttrdc.UUCP> <550@abnji.UUCP> <40@harvard.ARPA> <592@whuxl.UUCP>, <56@harvard.ARPA>

You should read The New Yorker articles during April on C3I capabilities
and implications.  The conclusion is that the incredible deficiencies are
not present because of incompetence, but because the normal technical
progress has tended towards producing first-strike capable weapons, and the
war plans have adjusted to that by adopting a first-strike posture.  Thus,
the deficiencies in C3I are not seen as serious because the Pentagon does
not expect to have to use the system *after* a Soviet strike, only to launch
a U.S. preemptive strike.  One can assume the Soviets have a mirror-image
plan.  Thus, the destabilization.  The build-up offers absolutely no answer
to this.  In fact, the Reagan programs -- MX, SDI, Trident II, Cruise --
all *worsen* the situation.