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From: mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate)
Newsgroups: net.religion
Subject: Re: the Temptations (not a singing group)
Message-ID: <5089@umcp-cs.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 22-Apr-85 23:43:57 EST
Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.5089
Posted: Mon Apr 22 23:43:57 1985
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References: <4880@umcp-cs.UUCP> <470@cybvax0.UUCP>
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In article <470@cybvax0.UUCP> mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) writes:

>> Well, he certainly doesn't use that device anywhere in Matthew or Luke,
>> which are the only gospels which count here.  And besides, your first
>> sentence rather baldly assumes that the purpose of incarnating God is so
>> that he can come down and rule the world.  Sounds to me like you're trying
>> to impose your notion of what a god should act like on Jesus, and then
>> saying he's an imposter because the shoe doesn't fit.

>You've precisely reversed my argument.  I am hypothesizing a fraud, and
>making retrodictions of what we would expect from one in response to
>some common ideas of what prophets, sons of god, etc. are likely to be
>like.  Because JC had to face the problem of other people's expectations.

But it seems to me that the whole thrust of this discussion is that the fact
of the temptations (as a story) does not distiguish between 

   (a) Jesus is a fraud, and wants to have an excuse not to work miracles,

and

   (b) Jesus is real, and Satan wants him to fall to the temptation to work
       miracles for the sake of getting followers.

The story fits either explanation; therefore, it seems to me that some other
standard gets you to (a).  Sure, if you chose {Jesus is a fraud}, you will
get Mike's interpretation of the temptations.  But the mere existence of the
story does not demonstrate {Jesus is a fraud}.

>"Fits the event better", huh?  You are starting with the excess assumptions
>of God and Satan.  Without those assumptions, I can construct a consistent
>hypothesis that fits just as well, using only human behavior such as we
>can observe around us.

So we're back to arguing on what basis we choose between the hypotheses.

>What inconsistencies?  However, I do first look for a non-miraculous
>explanation.  That is different than presupposing nobody can work miracles.

If you do not go on and look at the other possibilities, you are assuming
that there are no miracles.  One can construct a non-miraculous explanation
for ANY story; one can simply hypothesize that the "witnesses" lied.
Without testing that hypothesis, however, one cannot claim it as a theory.
That is precisely the problem I have;  the explanation Mike gives is valid
to the extent that it is AN explanation, but I want some justification of
why it is the RIGHT explanation.

>> And I do think there are problems with Mike's interpretation, even taking a
>> very critical approach to the story.  I have never, ever heard anyone use
>> the kind of justification for the failure of a miracle as Mike claims is
>> happening here.  For one thing, Jesus even compares his diciples to Satan!
>> For another, the incident represents a fairly weak excuse, since Jesus is
>> only refusing to perform miracles as tests of his power.  The temptations
>> are also never referred to by Jesus either; he certainly never uses the
>> incident as an excuse later on.  The incident's content is so highly
>> allegorical anyway that its meaning isn't particularly affected by whether
>> it actually happened or not.
>
>Originality is no excuse for rejection of an argument.  Nor is your
>admission that you haven't heard it before.

See "The revelation" series of articles.

>The analogy of JC's disciples to Satan wouldn't hold water because (with
>a burst of theological handwaving) Satan knew of JC's divinity and wasn't
>won over to JC's side.  The disciples were supposed to be unsure, and
>were won over to JC's side.

I don't really understand this argument, but it certainly seems to conflict
with the gospels.  Jesus calls Peter Satan on at least one occaision, and
the calls of the disciples are represented as being sudden, without use of
miracles.

>"Your analysis of this "event" seems to be predicated on the notion that
> thereare god(s) and miracles; before you can legitimately use such a
>principle, you need to provide some justification for it."

Gladly.  I am not taking this event as a demonstration of the Christian
truth.  I have other bases for my belief.  Under those beliefs, I interpret
the event as I have described.  If you want to argue in the same manner,
then make a claim.

>The above paragraph demonstrates the nature of your argument: special
>pleading.  I am proposing a simpler hypothesis: simpler because it involves
>fewer assumptions.  Contrary to what you say, I do not make an assumption of
>"no miracles": I simply do not use them in my hypothesis.

But the question is, why do you reject the use of miracles?  It seems to me
that, to apply the methods you advocate, you need to have a test to
distinguish between the various hypotheses.  If there is no experimental
test....
>Occam's Razor is a heuristic that even theologians sometimes employ to
>determine plausibility.  You employ all sorts of heuristics yourself.
>When you use the "fits the event better" heuristic, you could still be wrong;
>the actual explanation could be otherwise.  You are just trying to disqualify
>Occam's Razor because it weighs against your explanation.

No, that is not what Occam is all about.  Plausibility isn't a factor;
prediction is.  You rule out demons in physics because they have no
predictive power; you ignore God because, even assuming that Christianity is
correct, it doesn't increase the predictive power of a theory.  The Razor
allows you to anoint one theory in order that you do not at all times have
to consider every theory.

The problem is, when you start to talk about miracles, you give up all
pretense of prediction.  If you could predict it, then it wouldn't be
miraculous (in the sense of violating natural law; a "horizontal" miracle,
initiated in creation, obviously could not be distinguished on this level).
If prediction is not possible, then we aren't talking about science anymore.
Moreover, the simplest explanation (if you didn't see it yourself) is ALWAYS
that the witnesses lied or were mistaken.  It seems to me that, for a
non-miraculous theory of miracles to be preferable, there needs to be some
strong evidence of its truth.  How strong?  Well, obviously, it depends on
the individual.  I find the evidence strong enough; obviously, Mike doesn't.

I don't like the use of "heuristic" in this context.  It implies (to me
anyway) that it leads you closer to truth.  It in fact does no such thing.
Occam's Razor allows you to pretend that the mathematical constructs of
science are in fact truth.  In science, we don't care that they aren't; but
in religion, I think that it matters a great deal.

Charley Wingate   umcp-cs!mangoe