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From: padraig@utastro.UUCP (Padraig Houlahan)
Newsgroups: net.religion
Subject: Re: Hitler and Moral Relativism
Message-ID: <45@utastro.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 22-Apr-85 20:24:46 EST
Article-I.D.: utastro.45
Posted: Mon Apr 22 20:24:46 1985
Date-Received: Sat, 27-Apr-85 05:52:12 EST
References: <5178@cbscc.UUCP>
Organization: U. Texas, Astronomy, Austin, TX
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> 
> Byron Howes:
> }I'll answer your statements with a question adapted from one originally
> }posed by Tim Maroney:  Why do we consider it immoral for Hitler to have
> }attempted genocide against the Jews while we seem to consider it moral
> }for the Israelites to have attempted genocide against the Midianites.  I
> }submit that the morality of a particular act depends upon whether you
> }are the actor or the one acted upon (or allies thereof.)  If moral precepts
> }were applied consistantly throughout history by those who assert an
> }"absolute morality" I could be persuaded that such a thing exists.  I do
> }not find such evidence, hence moral relativism.
> 
> One question you're avoiding, Byron, is whether or not Hitler's actions,
> were moral.  Do you think they were, while they were actually going on?

I think that it is implied in Byron's answer that Hitler's actions were
wrong. This follows from the way he posed the question.

> You say the morality of an act depends on who is doing it.  What about the
> *reasons* for doing each?  Moral absolutes imply a common standard
> by which to judge each act.  What common standard would you propose for
> considering whether each of these acts is moral or not?  Do you pass
> judgement on either of them?  How do you answer your own question?  If
> you think both acts are immoral, what is the basis for that view, and
> what gives your view any real meaning?

> If you think the two acts are inconsistent you must be judging them
> so by a common standard.  Does it make sense for a moral relativist
> to do that?  

I would propose as a measure of their morality, the amount of pain,
misery, suffering, and needless discomfort inflicted. Generally this
is just a way of maximizing the stability, and harmony in society.
I see no problems with the moral relativist doing this and using it as
his standard.

> ... Is it always wrong to kill anyone for
> any reason?  Then you have an absolute and not a relativistic standard.

No, it is not always wrong to kill. One can kill in self defense.
How much misery would have been avoided if Hitler had been
assinated?

> Is the position inconsistent by the standard of Ancient Israel?  In
> that time God destroyed peoples for the sin that pervaded their society.
> That standard was the same both for the peoples surrounding Israel
> and Israel herself.  Scripture records countless judgments against
> Israel for their sin and yet they did not consider these judgements
> against them to be unjust.  It seems consistent to me.  To Israel,
> their moral standard did not depend on whether it faulted them or others.
> The judgements against Israel, recorded in their own Scriptures, are
> far more numerous and severe than any inflicted on other peoples.  Yet
> in those same Scriptures, God's judgements are many times extolled as being
> righteous.  How do your statements explain that?

All of this assumes the existence of a god of course. Personally
I don't have to explain it then since I don't recognize the existence
of a deity..

One can quite comfortably adopt a pragmatic standard as outlined above.
This standard is not absolute in itself, but suffices to compare acts
of genocide with one another.

> }I'm glad that the founders of our country declared life, liberty and the
> }pursuit of happiness to be "inalienable rights."  It makes life considerably
> }more pleasant here than it would be elsewhere.  I note in passing that
> }imprisonment, death penalties, legislated inqualities on the basis of sex,
> }immigration restrictions etc etc suggest that our "inalienable rights" are
> }quite abridgeable if the culture demands.  (This is not a statement of
> }approval or disapproval of death penalties or imprisonment.  It is merely
> }the observation although "inalienable" means not abridgeable, such rights
> }may be taken away anyway.)
> 
> You are glad that we consider certain rights inalienable because it makes
> your life pleasant.  Is that a reason why they should be considered as
> such? 

Yes, if in the process of doing so they will tend to make everyone's
life more pleasant.

> If not, can you give a reason?  Members of the KKK and certain Neo-Nazi
> groups apparently don't think the inalienable rights we accord to certain
> groups make life pleasant.  Wouldn't you have to see things from their
> point of view?  If it turns out that we shouldn't consider these rights
> inalienable where do we stand?  What gives us any right to draw the line
> of the KKK and the Nazis in *this* society?

Living in a democracy, the majority view holds. This is what keeps
extremist groups in check. The rights of the KKK have to be balanced
against the rights of their targets. The "greater good"  standard
described above is all that is required in order to do the balancing act.

> Charley Wingate's remark about moral relativists not taking moral relativism
> seriously seems to be generally true.  (There are those who have, I suppose.
> Sartre, Camus, Dostoevsky, and Nietzsche come to mind.) 

Sounds like an ad hominem argument to me.

> In order to get
> along it seems we must consider some moral values as being absolute.

This is not necessarily the case, as shown above.

>  But
> is seems to me that the moral relativist can give no binding reason for
> doing so.

It's as binding as "absolute morality" was on Hitler.

Padraig Houlahan.