Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!henry From: henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) Newsgroups: can.politics Subject: Re: Canadian participation in Star Wars. Message-ID: <5661@utzoo.UUCP> Date: Tue, 4-Jun-85 16:58:37 EDT Article-I.D.: utzoo.5661 Posted: Tue Jun 4 16:58:37 1985 Date-Received: Tue, 4-Jun-85 16:58:37 EDT References: <893@mnetor.UUCP> <5642@utzoo.UUCP> <896@mnetor.UUCP> <5645@utzoo.UUCP>, <906@mnetor.UUCP> Organization: U of Toronto Zoology Lines: 93 > ... Hundreds of bombs are not necessary. ... A couple of dozen > should be sufficient, or at least the most one could expend while > still maintaining a situation where life might be worth living > afterwards. Yes, I know there are probably more military targets > than that, but lets not go totally insane, or have we already? It depends on what we're talking about. If we are talking about whether smuggled bombs are a realistic alternative to an ICBM force, and hence a realistic counter-argument to SDI deployment, then it's not at all clear that a couple of dozen is enough. Especially given the Soviet view of targeting, which is *not* the same as the US view. The Soviets don't believe in the idea of holding civilian populations hostage, and never have. Not because they're sweethearts, mind you, but because they have a rather different philosophy of deterrence. The US philosophy can be summed up as "make it clear that a nuclear war would totally destroy both sides, so the Soviets will be too scared to start one". The Soviet philosophy, by contrast, is "make it clear that the US cannot possibly win a nuclear war, so they will be too scared to start one". So the Soviets point their ICBMs at military targets -- broadly defined, e.g. Toronto International is a military target because military aircraft could operate from it -- and not (except as an accidental result of the location of military targets) at population centers. Again, *not* because they are sweethearts, but because population centers per se are not tools for fighting a nuclear war, so attacking them is pointless -- it won't affect the US's ability to fight a war. When hundreds of bombs are involved, the difference quickly becomes academic, because all too many targets of military value are in or near population centers. When only a couple of dozen are involved... damned if I know. It's not at all obvious to me that the Soviets would think a couple of dozen bombs a useful deterrent. (Incidentally, learning about Soviet targeting philosophy -- on this fairly general level -- does not require access to anything classified. They are quite open about it, the same way the US is quite open about MAD. All you have to do is make an effort to find out, rather than just blindly assuming that both sides think the same way.) > Lots of people can keep a secret that big, though. Remember D-day? I sure do. And the Germans knew about it ahead of time too, although they had been carefully misled about the exact strategy and location. No, lots of people cannot keep a secret that big. If you want some proof, one of the photos in David Kahn's "The Codebreakers" is of a German telegram saying essentially "the `go' signal for the invasion has been broadcast, so the Allies will land tomorrow morning". The Germans were expecting a diversionary attack at Normandy followed by the real landing at Calais, so D-Day hit defences that weren't quite as strong as they might have been. And the notification of impending invasion hadn't gotten to all the German units that should have heard. But the German command most definitely knew about it well in advance. > Also leaving chemical explosives around for a while may cause > them to deteriorate, but nuclear devices or the kind we are discussing > should store quite well. The fissionable material is chemically > only metal, and hydrogen and such may need replenishing or whatever, > but mostly a status check once a month would be all that is necessary. A once-a-month status check is still enough to require a permanent organization in place. And nuclear bombs, by the way, contain chemical explosives. But you've missed my point; the reason one does not leave chemical explosives armed is not because they deteriorate, but because they might go off! Safe explosives handling requires elaborate paranoia. (For example, not only are detonators never stored already installed in explosives, but they are never stored in the same room as explosives, and are never transported in the same vehicle.) Nuclear bombs make this worse, not better: at least in peacetime, there must be no chance whatsoever that a nuclear bomb will explode without positive authorization to do so. Which means that the bomb must be armed only after an explosion has been authorized. The Soviets are, if anything, fussier about such positive central control than we are; it's one of the reasons why they are reluctant to rely heavily on missile subs. > Smuggling things across the border into the U.S. is not an > expensive proposition, merely illegal. With such a long border > and so few people defending it,(per mile), it would be a very > simple matter. If you assume that the US remains totally ignorant of what's going on, sure. As discussed above, this is an unrealistic assumption. And my previous comments about such smuggling being an act of war are also relevant. > The Soviet Union would be more difficult, but they > aren't planning a Star Wars defence system . . . yet. I hate to tell you this, but the Soviet Union has been more committed to antimissile defences than the US for many years. If they aren't planning the equivalent of SDI, it's a problem of capability rather than intent. -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry