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From: flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Walter Wego sponsor)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: OED vs Rosen -- belated reply
Message-ID: <6165@umcp-cs.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 30-May-85 02:38:40 EDT
Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.6165
Posted: Thu May 30 02:38:40 1985
Date-Received: Thu, 30-May-85 20:51:19 EDT
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Subject: please post net.philosophy s="OED vs. Rosen -- belated reply"

[one '>' = Rich Rosen, two = Ellis, zero = me]

> My point was and still is:  the notion of free will as you describe it, 
> being free to engage in actions independent of any external or internal 
> interference, IMPLIES DIRECTLY some agent that is external to physical 
> cause and effect!  IMPLIES DIRECTLY, meaning that it can be deduced 
> LOGICALLY from the premises of the definitions using the very same logical
> reasoning you take as a given elsewhere! 

But the IMPLICATION doesn't hold, DIRECTLY or otherwise.

> You ignored my points on "how can one have free will if one is not free
> to 'choose' the experiences that happen in one's life, some truamatic,
> that directly influence and in some cases control the way events
> and phenomena are interpreted by the brain, stored, and used as a BASIS for
> later decisions?"  You ignored them completely.  Why?  

I didn't IGNORE them, I just got saddled with a lot of other work at that
time, and didn't keep up with the netnews.  The OED article was one of the
last things I posted before my lull.  The article in which I reply to your
points should already be out by the time you read this one.

> I never claimed that the implications were imbedded in the definition!  I 
> said that they were CONSEQUENCES of that definition.  

Oh really?  I think your tune has changed.  Time to peruse my archives of
past articles...

> (How can you be free to choose anything if the elements of choice and 
> decision are part of your physical make-up which is involved in the cause
> and effect chain?  {easy -- pt}  Thus to have such a thing, you MUST have
> something outside this chain... I repeat myself very unnecessaily.

Indeed you do, since I've already refuted this argument before.  But for
the refutation of the latest version, see my most recent articles.
-----------------------------
> Subject: Re: Ellis on my positions
>>  B) the belief that man's choices ultimately are or can be voluntary, and
>>     not determined by external causes
>>     [Rich Rosen's] argument seems to run, roughly:	
>> 	If you have free will, the `agent of choice' must either reside
>> 	within the physical world, or without.
>>     1)If the agent of choice resides within the physical universe, then it
>> 	is just a bunch of chemicals. But chemicals have no power to decide
>> 	which course they take:
>> 	...since their behavior is fully determined. { LATER AMENDED TO: }
>> 	...since their behavior is fully determined by biochemical equations
>> 	up to quantum randomness, after which behavior is nondetermined
>> 	rather than chosen by an agent.[Ellis]

> Not "later amended to".  I never implied a "fully determined state" at 
> any point.  The word "determined" by the way, may erroneously imply some
> form of "determiner", which I also find no reason to believe in.[Rosen]

No; "determined" has no such implication, it means only "caused", plus the
assumption that the causation is (contra QM) not inherently random.  You
must have been talking to an Objectivist -- they like to redefine words
like "determinism".

>>     Rich, have I represented your arguments accurately?

> Aside from the comment above, yup.  Any comments from Mr. Torek?

Yes:  the inference to "chemicals have no power to decide which course..."
from "their behavior is fully determined...", is a non-sequitur.

				--The developing iconoclast,
				Paul V. Torek, (soon at) umcp-cs!flink