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From: hogg@utcsri.UUCP (John Hogg)
Newsgroups: can.politics
Subject: Re: Re: Some problems with Star Wars
Message-ID: <1196@utcsri.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 19-Jun-85 10:37:25 EDT
Article-I.D.: utcsri.1196
Posted: Wed Jun 19 10:37:25 1985
Date-Received: Wed, 19-Jun-85 10:44:03 EDT
Reply-To: hogg@utcsri.UUCP (John &)
Distribution: can
Organization: CSRI, University of Toronto
Lines: 45

Posted: Tue Jun 18 19:14:50 1985
Date-Received: 19 Jun 85 00:28:56 GMT
References: <1186@utcsri.UUCP>
Organization: U of Toronto Zoology
Lines: 24

Henry Spencer disputed the claim made in Andrew Gullen's SDI paper that
>     while missiles are many and  unpredictable,
>     satellites  are few, fragile and move in predictable orbits.
He argues that much better space-launch systems will be built as a result
of SDI, and therefore, "...satellites can be numerous, and armoured or
maneuverable."

	Satellites will still be undefendable, however.  No foreseeeable
technology will allow them to maneuver constantly; this means that they
can be sniped at for as long as the "other side" pleases.  Missiles have to
be protected for a small number of minutes, or even seconds.  Satellites
will be comparatively few, regardless of advances in space technology.  This,
by the way, is the single good point that I can see to SDI: it will force the
US to spend more on space research, however inefficiently.

Another claim of Henry's is that "the dangerously-provocative nature of the
actions needed to ready some types of SDI systems for action is an
argument against those specific types of system, not against all SDI
systems."  True; however, SDI proponents are seriously proposing such
idiotic concepts as pop-up X-ray lasers, and until they come up with a less
chameleon-like description of their program, I'll attack whatever they put
forward.

Regardless of how effective SDI actually is, it will be "dangerously
provocative" to the extent that the Soviets will (by standard military
practice) be forced to assume that it will live up to its billing: it will
be able to knock out *most* of a full-scale strike, and *all* of a
retaliatory strike.  Thus, their threat will be totally neutralized if they
wait out a first strike, and they will be forced into launch-on-warning.
The US warning system is clearly imperfect, to put it politely; the USSR
trusts theirs so little that, due to their current structure, they
basically *can't* launch-on-warning.  (Reference on request.)  Would you
like them to try for that capability?  There are geese in the Soviet Union,
too...
-- 

John Hogg
Computer Systems Research Institute, UofT
{allegra,cornell,decvax,ihnp4,linus,utzoo}!utcsri!hogg