Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Path: utzoo!henry From: henry@utzoo.UUCP (Henry Spencer) Newsgroups: can.politics Subject: Re: Some problems with Star Wars #2 (peripheral issues) Message-ID: <5726@utzoo.UUCP> Date: Mon, 24-Jun-85 17:00:27 EDT Article-I.D.: utzoo.5726 Posted: Mon Jun 24 17:00:27 1985 Date-Received: Mon, 24-Jun-85 17:00:27 EDT References: <1197@utcsri.UUCP> Organization: U of Toronto Zoology Lines: 42 I'm going to make a longer response to the main content of Ric Hehner's paper, but I thought I'd get a couple of peripheral things out of the way first, separately. > ...Ric and Andrew feel ... that debating on Usenet accomplishes little. I disagree, but not for the obvious reasons. It is quite possible that there is little chance of the debaters changing their views as a result of debate. What such discussion/debate can, and sometimes does, accomplish is to inform and educate the spectators. This is not trivial. > ... When airplane navigation software fails, a > planeload of people may die. This has happened more than > once; apparently the airlines consider it tolerable. ... I would like to see some references on this. If Ric is thinking of the Mount Erebus and KAL007 crashes, then he has weakened his argument with a serious error of fact. Neither of these crashes was a software failure (modulo some small uncertainty about KAL007). The Mount Erebus crash is definitely known to have been human error. Some navigation reference points were changed, and the change was not propagated to all the people who should have been told. As a result, correctly-working navigation software flew the plane into a mountain that the software thought was well off to one side. Bad weather made it impossible for the pilots to detect this in time. There is no suspicion of hardware or software failure. KAL007 is a bit less certain, because of lack of evidence, but the most plausible theory is a subtly-incorrect order given by the crew to the navigation software. (Ironically, slightly "smarter" software might have saved KAL007. The navigation software had to be given explicit instructions for each leg of a complex course, and had no overall knowledge of the course or the constraints on it. Hence the software was unable to apply any real consistency checks to the orders given to it.) As far as I know there is no suspicion of hardware or software failure. Finally I doubt that the airlines -- or the passengers, or the crews, or the government regulatory agencies -- consider fatal crashes "tolerable" regardless of their cause! -- Henry Spencer @ U of Toronto Zoology {allegra,ihnp4,linus,decvax}!utzoo!henry