Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.3 alpha 4/15/85; site ucbvax.ARPA Path: utzoo!linus!decvax!tektronix!zehntel!dual!ucbvax!arms-d From: arms-d@ucbvax.ARPA Newsgroups: fa.arms-d Subject: Arms-Discussion Digest V3 #29 Message-ID: <6917@ucbvax.ARPA> Date: Sat, 11-May-85 00:51:36 EDT Article-I.D.: ucbvax.6917 Posted: Sat May 11 00:51:36 1985 Date-Received: Mon, 10-Jun-85 04:24:39 EDT Sender: daemon@ucbvax.ARPA Organization: University of California at Berkeley Lines: 290 From: The Arms-D Moderator (Harold G. Ancell) Arms-Discussion Digest Volume 3 : Issue 29 Today's Topics: Background on SDI Unreliable Information KGB and Influence Agents Request for where to get State Dept Special Reports ---------------------------------------------------------------------- Note from Moderator: Pardon this late digest; MC was having problems last night. - Harold ------------------------------ Date: Mon, 6 May 85 13:06:20 pdt From: ihnp4!uw-beaver!ssc-vax!eder@Berkeley (Dani Eder) Subject: Re: Arms-Discussion Digest V3 #27 In order to provide the net with some information on SDI, I submit herewith a presentation made to the Royal Aeronautical Society, New Zealand Division, Christchurch, New Zealand, 8 March 1985, by Peter Downey, who was then Director of Preliminary Design, Research and Engineering Division, Boeing Aerospace Company. Preliminary Design is where SDI work is being done at Boeing. The words are Mr. Downey's. My own opinions do not necessarily agree. [My comments will appear in brackets such as these]. -------------------------------------------------------------------- The Strategic Defense Initiative and Space Peter Downey March 8, 1985 The historical approach to strategic nuclear warfare has been to develop larger numbers of more sophisticated offensive weapons. The awesome destructiveness of even a small percentage of these weapons could ruin the whole world if the nuclear winter theory of Sagan and others (Turco, R. P., O. B. Toon, T.P. Ackerman, J.B. Pollack, and C. Sagan. "Nuclear Winter: Global Consequences of Nuclear Explosions." TTAPS Report, Science, 23 December, 1983.) holds true. President Reagan's announcement of the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) in March 1983 signaled a fundamental change in this historical approach. The promise of SDI was expressed by Lieutenant General Abrahamson, director of the Strategic Defense Initiative Organization (SDIO): "The United States has set a goal --to achieve, through measures that are defensive, as well as through arms control, deep reductions in nuclear offensive forces" (Department of Defense. The Strategic Defense Initiative: Defensive Technologies Study, U.S. Government Printing Office, April 1984.). To achieve this goal, SDI must protect allied people and military forces from offensive nuclear weapons (Department of Defense. Defense Against Ballistic Missiles: An Assessment of Technologies and Policy Implications, U.S. Government Printing Office, April, 1984.). The first, ongoing step of this initiative is to study defensive system technologies that could intercept ballistic missiles and reentry vehicles. Once proven, these technologies could provide the basis for an effective defense system that will -- o Eliminate the ability of ballistic missiles to support preemtive nuclear strikes. o Create an environment conducive to negotiated force reductions by negating the value of ballistic nuclear missile forces. This paper reviews the historical evolution of offense and defense and relates this to the current use of space for offensive nuclear weapons. From this perspective, the broad requirements for strategic defense and the options for meeting these requirements are defined and evaluated. Though it is early to select an approach from the many possibilities, the intent of this paper is to show that near-term concepts of reasonable technical risk can fulfill the promise of SDI. [TO BE CONTINUED ---] ------------------------------ Date: Wed 8 May 85 01:01:27-EDT From: Rob Austein Subject: unreliable information Jeff, Two things you have posted recently are bothering me. One has already been mentioned by a number of people (the zero sum game assumption), so I won't elaborate on it since you will probably already have responded to it by the time I get this. The other one is from your comments on the low quality of information available to the public (as opposed to the intel community). I won't argue with your assertion that what is available to the intel community is superior; I had already come to the conclusion that the general public doesn't really have access to much real information on intel matters. What bothers me is the what seems to be the inescapable conclusion of your argument, namely, that since the general public doesn't have access to real information, we should not be forming opinions on these matters and should certainly not be acting on these opinions. I just don't see this as a viable alternative. I may well be reading something into your position that you didn't put there; if so, please tell me where I am erring. --Rob ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 8 May 85 01:50:36 EST From: Christopher C. Stacy Subject: KGB and Influence Date: Mon, 6 May 85 18:33:12 EST From: Herb Lin Please give an example of "influence" that does NOT include selling secrets. Often people don't start out selling secrets, but are worked up to it gradually. They start out making a seemingly hamrless mistake, and then are intimidated (ie., their jobs threatened) into actual illegal activities. Probably Mr. Miller can come up with some better examples, but here is a (rather simple and blatant) scenario which has been used to directly subvert persons working in classified areas. First, you are identified and targeted as a new operative. Your security access, personal, professional, and finiancial status is evaluated. You are approached in a public social setting, say at a bowling alley, by a friendly KGB agent claiming to be a salseman of some kind. Acquaintances are made and so forth. You are talked into obtaining for the agent some unclassified information (say, a list of people you work with.) While the initial and subsequent conversations are going on, you are unknowingly photographed with the agent. As time goes by, more unclassified information of various sorts is obtained for the agent. Sometimes you might even be paid or otherwise compensated for the trouble he has gone to. The agent starts asking for sensitive unclassified material. Eventually he works his way up to asking for actually classified material. Somewhere along the way you realize (at least to some extent) what is going on, and objects. When pressed, the agent explains that he is a KGB agent and that you have been working for him, and that you are going to continue to do so one last time. He presents you with photos showing you and he talking, you passing him (supposedly "classified") documents of some sort or another, and possibly even being paid for your services. He threatens to expose your espionage activities to the authorities if you don't do this last job. You do the last job. Now he's really got you, and can use you any time he wants. Probably regularly. You may possibly be reimbursed for your services.If you have been targeted for the long term, they may decide new job moves they wish you to make to get to the material they want. Etc. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 8 May 85 06:25:51 EST From: Herb Lin Subject: KGB and Influence To: CSTACY@MIT-MC Your example is a good one, and if I were KGB or CIA that is how I would do it. Still, it ultimately involves revealing secrets, and I think most of us would agree that a person who does such things is doing wrong things. What I still don't understand one way or the other is what "being influenced" means (as contrasted to being an operative as I think you described). ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 8 May 85 14:05:04 EDT From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 Subject: Soviet Intelligence Dear Don, Just a couple of points on your letter in the last digest. I don't know what to tell you about reconciling intel facts and what elected officials release. I would suggest that rather than expecting to be told intel secrets so as to select your leaders, ( who decides what intel to divulge, and how much?), vote carefully for the leaders you trust the most to act responsibly with our state secrets. I'm not advocating that people shouldn't read works such as Cockburn's book, if you go back to my original comments on Jong's review, you will see that my objection is to the use of that work in criticizing defense policy. The conclusions in the book about Soviet weaknesses are based on some very superficial intelligence on Cockburn's part. I can't criticize the author for the quality of intelligence - I have a good idea of what is available to a civilian doing research - nor would I criticize conclusions written from a standpoint informing the reader that those conclusions are based solely on the scratched surface of intel on the Soviet military. I feel Cockburn goes too far. Even Suvarov conveys a hesitancy to make any major pronouncements about the strengths or weaknesses of the army he'd served. Also; regarding your comments on KGB: 1) I personally use the yardstick that what is bad for the US is wrong. I read Morganthau and believe in the pragmatism of Realpolitik. We have to, because the USSR operates that way. 2) The KGB doesn't care about your opinions, nor the opinions of any followers of any movements that they have seen fit to use. In a Democratic society, all opinions are valid. (Theoretically.) The aims of the KGB have little to do with the aspirations of the groups infiltrated. Their aims are to find ways to increase conflict between the groups and the target government, utilizing all means of "Active Measures" to escalate the conflict, alienate the public from the government, and pressure government officials to adopt policies shaped by public demand which was in turned shaped by manipulation. If you are an individual who espouses the beliefs of the freeze movement, I have no quarrel with you. If you are a member of a freeze group, I have no quarrel with you, but I would attempt to suggest you monitor well your membership. If you are a member of a freeze group and either refuse to believe that Soviet intelligence might use you to their own ends because your ego won't permit, or claim that KGB support and activities are OK as long as they help you, I'm an opponent. ------------------------------ Date: Wed, 8 May 85 14:54:06 EDT From: Jeff Miller AMSTE-TOI 4675 Subject: KGB For Kevin Saunders - ( whose address as given proves indigestable to the system.) Sometimes I wish the intelligence services could waste taxpayers' money and create a full-time group to screen intelligence for purposes of release to the public. ( If you are personally affronted by "...this agents of influence twaddle", I suggest you contact the nearest Soviet embassy. It was they who coined the phrase Agent of Influence, as well as Active Measures. We simply make use of the translation.) I suppose we could publish the information gleaned from known KGB operations in the US - there might be an argument in favor of compromising our own counterintelligence operations conducted when hostile collectors or agents are detected - just so that some comfortably ensconsed civilians, with nothing personally at stake, might have nice topics for discussion. The most insipid whining I hear comes from those who, from armchairs well-distanced from the sharp edge, bitch and moan that the nasty government has no right to deprive them of secrets, regardless of danger to lives or painstakingly constructed intelligence and counterintelligence programs. > If you feel I'm saying YOU are an "enemy agent" or disloyal because the KGB finds your pet cause useful...you don't read well. > If you are mad because someone points out that the KGB finds your pet cause useful,......tough. > If you really believe the KGB uses any cause it "espouses" to promote world peace...I'll know you've never had business with them. By the way, note that I make no argument with your assessment of the military-industrial-government complex. I'm an intelligence professional. I try not to argue about those things I'm not qualified to argue about. - J. MILLER ------------------------------ Date: 9 May 85 16:37 PDT From: Tom Perrine Subject: References Where are the State Dept Special Reports available from? How about the House committee hearings minutes? Should I try my local library or write to someplace in D.C. ? Thanks, Tom Perrine ------------------------------ [End of ARMS-D Digest]