Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/5/84; site bunker.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!cbosgd!ihnp4!mhuxn!mhuxr!ulysses!gamma!epsilon!zeta!sabre!bellcore!decvax!ittvax!bunker!garys From: garys@bunker.UUCP (Gary M. Samuelson) Newsgroups: net.abortion Subject: Re: Re: Re: Re: Whose life anyway? Message-ID: <879@bunker.UUCP> Date: Fri, 21-Jun-85 10:03:35 EDT Article-I.D.: bunker.879 Posted: Fri Jun 21 10:03:35 1985 Date-Received: Sun, 23-Jun-85 06:56:18 EDT References: <545@bgsuvax.UUCP> <239@azure.UUCP> <867@bunker.UUCP> <259@azure.UUCP> <524@bunkerb.UUCP> <284@azure.UUCP> Organization: Bunker Ramo, Trumbull Ct Lines: 132 > In article <524@bunkerb.UUCP> garys@bunkerb.UUCP (Gary M. Samuelson) writes: > >(me) > >> > But in any case, the same argument would justify murder -- e.g., I > >> > haven't been murdered, and if I had been murdered, I wouldn't be > >> > around to wonder whether I should have been murdered. Now, aren't > >> > you glad you haven't been murdered? > >(Chris Anderson) > >> Oh but you are forgetting that before I am murdered, I do have the ability > >> to set up defenses (ie laws) to prevent myself from being murdered. I know > >> that I can be murdered, so I can do something to prevent it. > >> However, a fetus does not know that it can be aborted so it can't sit > >> around pondering the possibility of it happening. > >So the fact that the fetus can't defend itself justifies killing it? > *SIGH* I wish people would pay attention to the topic being discussed instead > of taking a single posting as is. If you had bothered to pay attention you > would have seen that we were discussing the relevancy of the question, > "What if you had been aborted?". I don't know about you, but I was discussing the morality of abortion. The question you quote was brought up (not by me, but that's not particularly relevant) by someone to suggest, I think, that our concepts of rights should by symmetrical. "How would you like it if someone did that to you?" is a common, and I think a valid, question to ask in determining the morality of a given action. > I was trying to point out that the question > was pointless for the very reasons I have so far given. They in no way relate > to whether it is right to "kill" the fetus but they do refer to what one > must consider when deciding on ones position concerning the "killing" of > the fetus (ie does the possibility of you being aborted have any relevancy > to the question at hand or does it just cloud the issue). Let me try to understand: Your reasons do not relate to whether abortion is right, but do relate to deciding whether abortion is right. OK, I can accept that. But your reasons are assertions unto themselves, and lead to certain conclusions, which I have shown and you have not denied. I notice that you consistently quote terms such as "life" and "kill" in reference to a fetus. Is this because you don't think that the fetus is really alive, and therefore technically can't be killed? If so, say so openly, and supply some substantiation. If not, leave them out -- they are clouding the issue. > >Or, to look at the other side of the same coin, if you were *not* > >able to pass laws to prevent your own murder (e.g., you live in a > >totalitarian state where certain classes of individuals may be legally > >killed), then it would not be wrong to kill you? > > Again, there is a difference. Before I am born not only do I not have the > power to hinder or encourage such a law but I would have no way of conceiving > of hindering/encouraging this law since the very concept of law is totally > foreign to my thought processes (limited though they be (when I'm a fetus, > not now :-))). :-# <-- someone biting his tongue. So it is morally acceptable to violate the rights of anyone who does not understand his or her rights; indeed, if one does not understand one's rights, those rights do not even exist. It's OK to kill someone who doesn't understand what being killed is. I suppose it is also OK to steal from someone who doesn't understand that he or she is being swindled (and some people think *my* ideas are dangerous). > Given that a fetus has a very limited range of sensory > inputs... Sorry, not given. There's not much for the fetus to see, but the sense of hearing, for example, works just fine. > (which it might not even notice since it has never been in a > situation in which those inputs didn't exist (you never notice something > until it's gone)) One is *apt* not to notice something until it's gone. It is false to say that one *never* notices something until it's gone (I thought you didn't believe in any absolutes :-). To continue the example of hearing, the sounds which the fetus can hear are certainly not constant; you have no basis for claiming that the fetus doesn't notice the sounds. > and assuming that it even has the ability to process > that data, the questions of law, morality, etc., are totally > unimportant to it. > >Does your logic apply to my 2 1/2 year old daughter?... > Here we do get into a sticky point. A very young child (1-3 years say) might > have as limited a conception of law, morality, death, etc., as the fetus, > so by my reasoning it might seem that the life of a child is no different > then the "life" of a fetus. And you would probably be right in drawing that > conclusion. It's only sticky because to be consistent you have to conclude what follows. That conclusion apparently sticks in your craw a little, so to speak, so I am not surprised that you hedged a little in answering the question. (I refer to your use of the words "might" and "probably." What it amounts to is that you don't think a child under 3 has any more right to live than the fetus, whom you don't think has any right to live. > However, any moral/philosophical principle I follow is never graven in stone. That statement is self-contradictory. You have taken as an absolute principle the position that no (other) principle is absolute. > I approach things basically on a case by case basis, using the above mentioned > moral principles as guidelines in which to work. I *DO NOT* consider them > to be absolute (I have my doubts about whether there is anything that is > absolute). OK, let's take a case -- I conclude from your postings that you think it would be morally acceptable to kill my daughter, if it suited you to do so. Perhaps you would not do so, but someone else might be convinced (possibly being predisposed to do so) that you are right and kill my daughter, for whatever reason. You therefore present a real, if not imminent, danger to my daughter, whom I desire to protect. Would it be wrong for me to kill you to remove that danger? If so, why? I realize that we have wandered off the topic of abortion, but I feel that it is important to show the logical consequences of a position. And Chris's reasoning logically leads to the above scenario. Gary Samuelson