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From: mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy,net.religion
Subject: Re: Religious Language and Science
Message-ID: <6319@umcp-cs.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 5-Jun-85 23:57:44 EDT
Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.6319
Posted: Wed Jun  5 23:57:44 1985
Date-Received: Fri, 7-Jun-85 05:21:18 EDT
References: <6261@umcp-cs.UUCP> <568@cybvax0.UUCP>
Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD
Lines: 45
Xref: watmath net.philosophy:1878 net.religion:7058

In article <568@cybvax0.UUCP> mrh@cybvax0.UUCP (Mike Huybensz) writes:

>> There would be no need for religious language if the things could be
>> talked about directly...

>"There would be no need for jabberwocky if Wonderland could be talked
>about directly."
>
>In other words (less sarcasm) you still retain the problem of whether
>the language conceals that its subject is nonexistent.  You still have no
>non-circular reason for assuming the things exist and that the language
>is necessary.

Turn the problem around.  If the things do exist and the direct language is
inadequate, then insistence upon direct language will necessarily lead to
the conclusion that the things cannot be sufficiently demonstrated to exist.

People do have "mystical experiences". (I use quotes because I don't mean to
imply anything about the "true nature" of them; there is, however, a class of
experiences which can be directly characterized.)  Uniformly it is insisted
that the experience cannot be related in words, and I can attest to this
through personal witness, having had (in a limited fashion) this sort of
experience myself.  Now, to the best of my knowledge, no one has come up
with an explanation of this events which appeals to purely natural causes
AND which has been subjected to experimental verification.  These phenomena
represent (if the claims of the mystics are true) our most direct contact
with the supernatural, as we all seem to agree that miracles, which are the
next most direct testimony, are necessarily weak as testimony.  Central to
the claims of the mystics is ineffability, that the phenomena are not
expressible in language.  I first must point out that this is not
necessarily in and of itself a claim to a supernatural experience, since
(conceivably) some mental processes have the same property.  Likewise, it is
possible that the person is mistaken, that the experience could be described
in words adequately.  It seems to me therefore that the questions of
existence and language are separate.  Given that people in general are cut
off from sharing the mystic's experience, it seems to me that from a
practical point of view, we have to assume that whatever language the mystic
IS using is inadequate; but this does not cut us off from an examination of
the possible sources of the experience.  It may be demonstrable that the
experience has certain physical causes, at which point it may be possible to
evaluate the effectiveness of the language.  But I think that demanding
direct language is fruitless, if only because it eliminates the possibility
of determining that direct language is not adequate.

Charley Wingate   umcp-cs!mangoe