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From: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Rich Rosen vs Free Will
Message-ID: <307@spar.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 10-Jun-85 08:31:14 EDT
Article-I.D.: spar.307
Posted: Mon Jun 10 08:31:14 1985
Date-Received: Thu, 13-Jun-85 01:27:28 EDT
References: <204@spar.UUCP>
Reply-To: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis)
Organization: Schlumberger Palo Alto Research, CA
Lines: 65

Some comments on Rich Rosen's position for those who are interested...

>    [Free Will] - the belief that man's choices ultimately are or can be 
>    voluntary, and not determined by external causes
>    
>    [Rich's] argument seems to run, roughly:	
>
>	If you have free will, the `agent of choice' must either reside
>	within the physical world, or without.
>
>    1)	If the agent of choice resides within the physical universe, then it
>	is just a bunch of chemicals. But chemicals have no power to decide
>       which course they take since their behavior is fully determined by
>	biochemical equations up to quantum randomness, after which behavior
>       is nondetermined rather than chosen by an agent.

    Several problems here.

    First, this argument confuses a set with its elements. If an `agent' is
    made out of chemicals, does that mean it IS just chemicals? 

    Second, this argument presupposes that the behavior of higher level
    phenomena is reductionistically determined by the behavior of its parts.
    Check out discussions on the Einstein/Podolsky/Rosen experiment if you
    would like examples of scientific phenomena that appear to violate this
    assumption.

    Third -- just what is the connection between the chemicals' `random
    behavior' and the `agent of choice'? Blind insistence that such
    randomness is the cause of the agent's choice, rather than the effect,
    (or even something else..) seems most unconvincing to me.

>
>    2)	If the agent of choice does not reside in the physical world, then
>	it is an external agent...
>
>	{Furthermore a `ghost-in-the-machine', in turn, must have some
>	 mechanism itself that causes it to decide, thus, it does not
>	 have free will}

    This presupposes that all phenomena, even in a hypothetical universe,
    must be reduceable to causal connections among mechanistic parts.
 
    Suppose that `in the non-physical universe' of the `ghost-in-the-machine',
    agents have no `internal mechanisms'? Or if they do, that such mechanisms
    do not fully `determine' the choice of the agent?

===========================================================================

    Rich has pointed out that one of the problems with Free Will is the
    inability of its proponents to supply an adequate noncontradictory
    definition. I concur with this criticism, and wish to add that existing
    philosophical language seems to be unable to grasp known scientific
    phenomena as well. 

    Many intuitive ideas force themselves upon us, not because they are
    consistent with our flawed preconceptions of the universe, but because
    they suggest a deeper truth than our language and philosophical
    notions can capture. 

    Maybe `Free Will' is such an idea.

    SMASH CAUSALITY!!

-michael