Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site pyuxd.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!pyuxww!pyuxd!rlr From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Arthur Pewtey) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: freedom and unpredictability Message-ID: <1103@pyuxd.UUCP> Date: Tue, 18-Jun-85 14:01:18 EDT Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1103 Posted: Tue Jun 18 14:01:18 1985 Date-Received: Wed, 19-Jun-85 05:59:37 EDT References: <91@umcp-cs.UUCP> <325@spar.UUCP> Organization: The Chartered Accountants Who Want to Be Lion Tamers Association Lines: 47 > Just to keep things straight -- it appears we have at least four > views of `Free Will': > > John Williams: The universe is deterministic but unknowable due to lack > of information about the universe's initial conditions. > Free Will somehow somehow derives from this built-in > lack of knowledge. But OUR lack of knowledge on a subject surely does not have a bearing on its existence or non-existence. The fact that we didn't know about quarks hundreds of years ago (or microbes) doesn't mean that those things didn't exist back then. Likewise for the predictability factor. Regardless of our knowledge, if sequences of events are determined, they are determined, whether WE humans can determine them or not. > Paul Torek: Determinism is irrelevant. Even a perfectly predictable > agent can have free will, which consists of the ability > to satisfactorily manipulate the universe based on > one's knowledge and desires. > > Michael Ellis: Free Will probably requires a nondeterministic universe > with acausal connections and randomness, such as > we might be living in. > > Rich Rosen: Regardless of whether the universe is deterministic > there is no free will because any definition appears to > be self-contradictory. Not ANY definition. Paul has certainly given definitions that are not self-contradictory, but of course he defines it so that it DOES exist because he wants to believe in free will. What he refers to as "my" (Rich Rosen's) definition of free will is in fact the common accepted notion of what free will means, and it is THAT definition that directly implies a self-contradiction: how can an agent be truly free if it is a part of the world of cause and effect, since that agent itself is thus subject to its laws and is thus determined. I'm with Michael in that the notion of free will requires the acausal universe he describes, and in that it thus requires an agent of action outside the scope of that universe to satisfy the definition. But then again, I think Mike is grasping for straws in that he is defining a universe that provides for free will based on his desire to have a universe in which there could be free will, rather than based on the evidence. Which is why he always concludes his articles by saying: > SMASH CAUSALITY!!! -- "Wait a minute. '*WE*' decided??? *MY* best interests????" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr