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From: jim@ISM780B.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Re: freedom and unpredictability
Message-ID: <27500082@ISM780B.UUCP>
Date: Wed, 19-Jun-85 19:19:00 EDT
Article-I.D.: ISM780B.27500082
Posted: Wed Jun 19 19:19:00 1985
Date-Received: Sun, 23-Jun-85 02:11:01 EDT
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Nf-From: ISM780B!jim    Jun 19 19:19:00 1985


>But OUR lack of knowledge on a subject surely does not have a bearing on its
>existence or non-existence.

It most certainly does when the subject consists only of semantic constructs
used for conceptual organization and communication between human beings.
Such is the case with Free Will.  It is even true of Determinism.
A strict meaning of Determinism is that it is true if there is only one
future.  But whether the multiple futures in the multiple-worlds model
are "real" futures is subject to debate.  A looser form of Determinism
which many people seem to use is that there is only one *possible* future.
Given quantum uncertainty and no multiple-worlds model, there is only
one true future but many possible ones; i.e., the real future is not necessary
or *determined* by the current state, but it is the only one that will
happen nonetheless.  Since our lack of knowledge is reflected in the very
*meanings* we assign these terms, their existence is dependent upon it.
If you can say that Free Will does not really exist because its just a bunch
of chemicals, then I will tell you that chairs do not exist because they
are just a bunch of probability waves.  Acting as though the language and the
words are absolutes upon which you can draw absolute arguments about
existence are no more valid than the pre-Einsteinian presumption that time
was an absolute upon which you could map simultaneity, or the pre-Galilean
presumption that location was an absolute upon which you could map the
celestial spheres.

>Paul has certainly given definitions that are not
>self-contradictory, but of course he defines it so that it DOES exist
>because he wants to believe in free will.

Paul gives definitions that he thinks are reasonable and match common sense.
I happen not to agree.

>What he refers to as "my" (Rich Rosen's)
>definition of free will is in fact the common accepted notion of what free
>will means,

If you expect people to accept the truth of this without proof, you are
simply an ass.  You give definitions which you think are reasonable and
match common sense.  I happen not to agree.  To argue *ad hominem* that your
definitions are better is dishonest.  *Demonstrate* to the satisfaction
of people who disagree with you that your definitions match common accepted
notions.  Simply stating your definition and asking people if they agree
with it is not sufficient, since other definitions have not been stated
and since people are naive about contradictions embedded in
reasonable-sounding defintions.  The question is, do the
*conclusions/predictions* of what is or is not a free choice given your
definition match peoples' expectations.

>how can an agent be truly free if it is a part of the
>world of cause and effect, since that agent itself is thus subject to its
>laws and is thus determined.

You keep asking this question, as though it is an obvious contradiction.
But it only is if you have a definition of "truly free" which is mutually
exclusive with "determined".  Such a definition is not *necessary*.
I hold that it is nonsensical and contradictory to common meaning to hold
that "truly free" means "completely unrestrained", since this would mean
even free from restraints, e.g., to remain human.  No one on the street
is going to demand the ability to stop being human as a requirement for
having Free Will.  It is intellectually dishonest, or at least masturbatory,
to carry the definition of Free Will to such an extreme that it cannot
possibly be applied, and then say "look, see, there is no such thing".
Rather, one should try to *constrain* the definition in such a way as that it
becomes a meaningful and useful tool for discourse.

>But then again, I think Mike is grasping for straws in that he
>is defining a universe that provides for free will based on his desire to
>have a universe in which there could be free will, rather than based on the
>evidence.

"the evidence."  The evidence says that "Free Will" consists of certain
vibrations of elastic bands in our throats, or certain combinations of
straight lines, etc.  But "the evidence" misses the point, because it
is operating at the wrong level of discourse.  The evidence also indicates
that love, caring, and sensitivity  don't exist, they are just manifestations
of evolutionarily produced behavior mechanisms.  But then people *act* upon
such "evidence" and *choose* to write papers and subject people to
their beliefs and *feel* that they are justified.  *You* know damn well
that you are choosing to type what you do.  The fact that you may be
determined to do it is *irrelevant*.  It operates on a different level
of discourse.  If you ever come to understand the dichotomy, you may become
more interesting to talk to.

-- Jim Balter (ima!jim)