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From: tonyw@ubvax.UUCP (Tony Wuersch)
Newsgroups: net.politics.theory
Subject: Re: What is "capitalism"? (Explorations of "self-interest")
Message-ID: <211@ubvax.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 17-Jun-85 16:54:29 EDT
Article-I.D.: ubvax.211
Posted: Mon Jun 17 16:54:29 1985
Date-Received: Fri, 21-Jun-85 01:26:35 EDT
References: <298@spar.UUCP> <2380030@acf4.UUCP>
Organization: Ungermann-Bass, Inc., Santa Clara, CA
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In article <2380030@acf4.UUCP>, mms1646@acf4.UUCP (Michael M. Sykora) writes:
> When I say what is best for X, I don't mean technically, but rather what X
> should attempt to get out of life.  X may not know what is best for
> him/herself.  But if X does not indeed know, then on what basis could X make a
> decision to trust the decision to Y & Z?

In many strategic situations (where more than one actor is needed to ensure
success), an actor's goals may be influenced by what that actor considers
as possible.  If what is possible depends on the actions or strategies
pursued by other parties, such that alliance with those parties helps X,
then X may have reason to trust the decision to Y & Z of what the group
strategy should be, especially if X has no power over the determination
of that strategy anyways.

That is, there are many strategies where being a follower is optimal,
even if the follower doesn't quite know what's going on.  In fact, knowing
what is going on may hurt a follower in the sense that the follower's
anticipation of leaders' strategies may make the follower a candidate
for scapegoating or being passed over due to over-ambitiousness.

In the world political situation, most smaller nations fit the above
description of X and X's optimal strategy.  In lots of organizations too.

Tony Wuersch
{amd,amdcad}!cae780!ubvax!tonyw