Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site pyuxd.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!pyuxww!pyuxd!rlr From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: free choice as rational evaluation and action Message-ID: <1273@pyuxd.UUCP> Date: Sun, 21-Jul-85 22:12:42 EDT Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1273 Posted: Sun Jul 21 22:12:42 1985 Date-Received: Wed, 24-Jul-85 20:57:20 EDT References: <1043@pyuxd.UUCP> <6155@umcp-cs.UUCP> <1191@pyuxd.UUCP> <817@umcp-cs.UUCP> <1227@pyuxd.UUCP> <904@umcp-cs.UUCP> Organization: Whatever we're calling ourselves this week Lines: 92 >>Those things that are a "part of one's identity". How were they acquired? >>Does one get to choose the patterning with which one later evaluates and >>analyzes? Of course not. Thus, since the decisions and actions are dependent >>on these unfree internal elements plus the externals over which one has no >>control as they become part of the internalized knowledge construct structure. >>this whole process is not free. > Yes, the internal elements are caused by "external" events. They're not > freely chosen -- at first. But in your argument the "unfreeness" of an > internal factor caused by external factors is assumed to "carry over" to > whatever the internal factor causes. I don't think that's legitimate, at > least not when the internal factor is something like the capacity for r-e-a. > Anything reviewed and accepted by r-e-a is (becomes) free, including the > r-e-a procedure itself. Consider: why should I regard any internal feature > as making me unfree, when that feature is something *desirable*, something > I *accept* and have every reason to accept? How is one "constrained" by > something one *wants*? I went into this in another article, but I'll reiterate. Take for example the child who is brought up in a violent home, with constant fighting by his parents, etc. The things he/she learns are fmaily abuse, violence in relationships, etc. as appropriate things. He/she learns to expect from a relationship what the parents each expect out of their spouses, and grow up expecting and in fact "wanting" such things. Clearly such a person grows up "constrained" by what he/she wants. (Another more frivolous example: I want to like apricots, but I just can't.) >>You make the extremely erroneous claim the freedom is equivalent to the >>ability to act rationally, which is very far from the truth. [...] >>to be truly free, one's choices of action must be one's own, and not those >>*determined* by a series of events that were experienced. > But if one can act rationally then one *is* choosing -- the choices are > *both* one's own *and* are those *determined* as you indicate. How so? How are they "choices" at all in the sense you describe? The behavior described above might be perceived as quite rational to someone brought up like that. You are not necessarily constrained to be what you call "rational", you are constrained to be whatever your chemistry makes you. That ain't freedom in the sense you're talking about. >> [...] the fact that YOU have incorporated into your brain many >>experiences that have a direct effect on the way you think and evaluate quite >>clearly makes YOU un-free: you are bound to act as your experiences and >>accumulated knowledge dictate that you will. > Neat word there, "bound", ambiguous between "constrained" and "predisposed > to". I am predisposed to act as my experiences, etc. dictate -- that's true > -- but I'm not "constrained" to do so, because "constrained" means that > there's something else I might want to do or have reasons to do. And there > isn't. One can't be "constrained" by something one wants and has every > reason to want -- that's no constraint at all. See above. You make a special case about "wanting" not involving constraint because it's "what you want". But clearly that's just assuming your conclusion to do so. >>> You have an agent and *self*-control, which IS freedom. (I think that if >>> you look at a detailed dictionary definition of freedom you'll find >>> "self-control" listed as one of the synonyms.) >>You seem to be under the erroneous impression that being free means being able >>to choose the best rational course of action. Being free, in fact, means >>being able to choose without constraint (choosing the rational only would be >>a constraint). Self-control and REA are not synonyms for freedom. > Freedom = autonomy = self-control. REA is a synonym for "free will", as that > term has been used in some philosophical discussions, as well as by some > non-philosophers (such as Robert Trivers in the Omni interview I quoted). I went into that in another article. But where you get your "="s is truly beyond me! I could just as easily say "freedom = dark gloopy things on ice cream = hot fudge sauce". (In fact, I have! :-) >>I quote, though, from Webster's: "1. [...] a) the absence of necessity, >>coercion, or constraint [LIKE ONLY BEING ABLE TO CHOOSE >>TO DO WHAT YOUR INNER CHEMICALS DETERMINE THAT YOU WILL DO] in choice >>or action, b) liberation from slavery or restraint or from the power of >>another [I WOULD ASSUME ANOTHER THING AS WELL AS ANOTHER PERSON HERE]". > The causal determinism of choice might count as "necessity" -- you might > have a case there -- but as long as the mechanisms by which we make > choices are both desirable and desired, then, it seems to me, no > limitation of our freedom is implied. But which things become "desirable" or "desired" is not a universal thing, it is based on those prior experiences I keep talking about and that you keep ignoring. Since desirability of things is a result of the conditioning of the prior experiences, that is clearly not freedom. -- "Meanwhile, I was still thinking..." Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr