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From: cjp@vax135.UUCP (Charles Poirier)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Third two bits on free will
Message-ID: <1134@vax135.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 21-Jul-85 22:04:57 EDT
Article-I.D.: vax135.1134
Posted: Sun Jul 21 22:04:57 1985
Date-Received: Wed, 24-Jul-85 21:00:33 EDT
Organization: AT&T Bell Labs, Holmdel, NJ
Lines: 99

[Paul Torek]:
> We even agree that the non-existence of what *he* [Rich Rosen] calls
> "free will" is nothing to worry about.

Great!  I will cease discussing it for now.

> But I think that fact shows that something is wrong with his
> definition, for surely most people want to be "free".

Because Paul quotes the word "free", I infer that the point is not (the
irrelevancy that) people want to be free (without the quotes).  I take
this rather as saying "let's not waste the word 'free' on something
unproductive"; as saying "we've disposed of classical free will, so
let's address a relaxed meaning: that which people commonly perceive as
'the ability to have, and to act on, one's own decisions.'"  I proceed
on the basis of this interpretation, for which I find further support
in Paul's comments:

> A cause of behavior is not strictly external if it operates through
> "man" and his "volition".

[The ability to have one's own decisions.]

> Examples of unfree behavior are:  being forcibly dragged where you
> don't want to go, being locked behind bars and thus confined, etc.

[The (in)ability to act on one's own decisions.]

I note that these are references to *behavior*, and not specifically to
*will* or volition.  Perhaps in the reductionist, determinist sense
which we (excepting John Williams -- I hope to address his reference to
QM if I have time) have disposed of, "volition" is a special case of
"behavior".  But having disposed of that, I suggest for the sake of
clarity (a much-needed commodity) that we restrict our use of
"behavior" to refer to things that are consequences of volition and
exclude volition itself.  I further suggest that we should refrain from
implicitly equating "free will" (self-directed volition) with "free
behavior" (self-directed action).  Do so explicitly if you must.
"Will" is what you want to do, not what you do do.  Ok so far?

I let "behavior" refer to physical or mental action.  That which you
more-or-less instantaneously know that you want is "volition", but that
which you more-or-less have to analyze and figure out (through time)
that you want, is a case of "behavior".

I draw a fine line through "REA" with the above classification.  If I
understand it correctly (and I'm far from sure), rational evaluative
analysis consists of analytical behavior followed by a (possibly new)
volitional state.

> Conversely, when the direct causes are internal to "man's volition",
> the behavior is free.  [taken out of sequence from the next quote]

This concept is "free behavior".  It certainly exists in some cases:
"I pick my nose" (because I felt like it).  "Unfree behavior" also
exists: "I sneeze" (even though I didn't want to sneeze).

> In all these examples [jailing, etc.] the DIRECT cause of the
> behavior is external to the man and his volition, THAT is what makes
> them unfree.

The so-called "acts" of being dragged away, jailed, *et cetera* I don't
count as behavior at all.  If one counts a falling rock as exhibiting
"unfree behavior", one must count a rock just sitting there as
"intelligent behavior".  Phooey.  These things are trivial.  I think we
should return to "free will" and leave the discussion of behavior to
the behaviorists.

Getting back to the point, I think this quote sums up Paul's meaning
of "free will":

> We are made unfree only when there are influences on us that we
> *should* reject but *don't*.

(Implicitly) what we should reject is what REA tells us to reject.
To the extent that rationality is only relative (can't always be
determined absolutely), this means free will can't be an absolute.
Such a concept of "relatively free will" I find reasonable and
acceptable, but not very powerful.

I have some final questions about REA for Paul.  Since I missed the
full original exposition, mail any obviously redundant answers.
Suppose someone makes a stupid decision (or action).  Does its
stupidity *per se* preclude its having been based on REA?  Does one
qualify for REA if one considered the consequences of the decision in a
way that seemed rational but "objectively wasn't" (whatever that might
mean)?  Does one qualify if one even peripherally considered the
consequences?  If he just accepted someone else's analysis without
getting an opportunity to analyze for himself first?  Simply if the
choice was self-directed?

	Bit-wise and byte-foolish,
	Charles Poirier (decvax, ucbvax, ihnp4)!vax135!cjp

P.S. Rich Rosen, mail to your supposed mail address of ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr
     is bouncing at ihnp4 with the message "Bad system name, pyuxd".
     Barring, of course, that they're forged bounces and you just don't
     want to talk to me, maybe you should post alternate paths.
     Like aversion, (Heave!) disgust for you every last time.  (c;