Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site gargoyle.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!mhuxr!mhuxn!ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes From: carnes@gargoyle.UUCP (Richard Carnes) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: Free Will Definitions Message-ID: <526@gargoyle.UUCP> Date: Tue, 23-Jul-85 18:50:20 EDT Article-I.D.: gargoyle.526 Posted: Tue Jul 23 18:50:20 1985 Date-Received: Thu, 25-Jul-85 06:07:00 EDT Distribution: net Organization: U. Chicago, Astronomy & Astrophysics Lines: 41 In article <> tmoody@sjuvax.UUCP (T. Moody) writes: > It is a howler to suppose that "free will" >has some single univocal meaning that is historically entrenched. This >concept has been under philosophic scrutiny for a *long* time; it has >worn many "definitions." >... >...the task of philosophy is >not to prove that [free will] does or does not "exist", >but to *understand* it and fit it into a larger worldview. Buy that man a Classic Coke -- Todd Moody makes some excellent points. Freud, like Rosen, argued that freedom is an illusion because our actions are determined by mechanisms beyond our awareness. But one of the principal strands of meaning in the complex notion of freedom has been the ability to do as one wishes, or (a more sophisticated notion) the capacity to make rational choices. We call a man who has been "liberated" (from prison, oppression, bondage to sin, neurosis, ignorance) "free" not only because the previous constraints have been removed, but also because in a positive sense he can now achieve his goals, fulfill his desires, take action according to rational criteria, etc. The fact that his goals, desires, and choices may be determined by "chemicals" (why not quarks and leptons?) or prior events does not negate this new ability of his, just as when Paul (of Tarsus, not Torek) became "a slave to Christ" (i.e. his will was determined by Christ's) he experienced it as freedom from bondage to sin and the law, and wrote about it in those terms (in the Epistle to the Romans, I think). (Rich please note: this comment is not directed against Jewish beliefs about the Law.) Understanding how rational choice-making is possible, given our scientific worldview, seems to be the current philosophical task in this area, requiring a philosophical finesse akin to the theological finesse required for steering between the Pelagian and Manichaean heresies. (Augustine's *Confessions* is one of the more interesting discussions of freedom.) Hope this confuses things. Richard Carnes, ihnp4!gargoyle!carnes