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From: franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Third two bits on free will
Message-ID: <536@mmintl.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 25-Jul-85 15:16:40 EDT
Article-I.D.: mmintl.536
Posted: Thu Jul 25 15:16:40 1985
Date-Received: Sun, 28-Jul-85 05:25:12 EDT
References: <1134@vax135.UUCP>
Reply-To: franka@mmintl.UUCP (Frank Adams)
Organization: Multimate International, E. Hartford, CT
Lines: 99
Summary: 


In article <1134@vax135.UUCP> cjp@vax135.UUCP (Charles Poirier) writes:
>I note that these are references to *behavior*, and not specifically to
>*will* or volition.  Perhaps in the reductionist, determinist sense
>which we (excepting John Williams -- I hope to address his reference to
>QM if I have time) have disposed of, "volition" is a special case of
>"behavior".  But having disposed of that, I suggest for the sake of
>clarity (a much-needed commodity) that we restrict our use of
>"behavior" to refer to things that are consequences of volition and
>exclude volition itself.  I further suggest that we should refrain from
>implicitly equating "free will" (self-directed volition) with "free
>behavior" (self-directed action).  Do so explicitly if you must.
>"Will" is what you want to do, not what you do do.  Ok so far?

I don't think this is quite right.  First, you seem to be using "will" and
"volition" as synonyms here; I will assume so, but correct me if this is
wrong.  Second, you should have avoided the word "want".  If I want to
go to work today, but decide I am too tired and stay in bed instead (this
is not a common occurrence), then I do not will my going in to work,
although I want it.  This seems consistent with the rest of your article.
Let me restate this as "'Will' is what you choose to do, not what you do do."
This is not a perfect formulation either, because some will interpret
"choose" to mean "choose after evaluation"; but I can think of no better
word.

>I let "behavior" refer to physical or mental action.  That which you
>more-or-less instantaneously know that you want is "volition", but that
>which you more-or-less have to analyze and figure out (through time)
>that you want, is a case of "behavior".

This is at best a very non-standard meaning of "behavior".  Behavior is
whatever you do.  I don't know of a good way to express the concept you
wish to express; nor am sure it is a valid concept.

Once one has "analyzed and figured out", and the time has come to act
on one's conclusions, one exercizes one's will or volition to take action.
Contrariwise, when one takes action immediately in a situation, it is
generally because some analysis has gone before; one recognizes the
situation as one requiring certain actions.

The exceptions to this generalization are potentially enlightening.  If
an object is flying towards my eyes, I will blink and/or duck.  This action
is "instinctive"; I will do it even if I have never been in or thought about
such a situation before.  (It is sometimes possible to suppress this reaction
by an exercize of will, but I don't think this is relevant.)  I believe
that the common usage of the phrase would deny that this is an exercize
of my "free will"; although I am not externally constrained any more than
I am generally.

This is consistent with an REA interpretation, but let me try another
definition: I am exercizing my free will when my volition derives from
my conscious mind.

First objection: consciousness is a subjective phenomenon, not vulnerable
to proof.  So is volition.  Seriously, I think in time we will gain an
understanding of brain processes on a level where consciousness is a
meaningful and verifiable phenomenon.  In the mean time, if you don't
believe in it, go away and don't bother me (1/2 :-)

Second objection: this is not an all or nothing thing.  If I make a
conscious decision to buy a candy bar, I may be being influenced by the
subliminal advertising.  To which I reply, so what?  As Rich has so often
reminded us, we are the product of a great many influences; why is a
recent and specific one more significant than older and less specific ones?
If I make a conscious decision to by a candy bar, I am exercizing my free
will.  If I find myself back in my seat eating a candy bar, and wondering
why I bought it, I did not.

>The so-called "acts" of being dragged away, jailed, *et cetera* I don't
>count as behavior at all. [...] I think we
>should return to "free will" and leave the discussion of behavior to
>the behaviorists.

Yes and no.  Those "acts" are indeed not behavior.  *Therefore*, it is
appropriate for us to keep talking about behavior, since it is closely
related to "will".

>(Implicitly) what we should reject is what REA tells us to reject.
>To the extent that rationality is only relative (can't always be
>determined absolutely), this means free will can't be an absolute.
>Such a concept of "relatively free will" I find reasonable and
>acceptable, but not very powerful.

Let me amplify this.  It is theoretically impossible to know all the
consequences of the facts in one's possession (assuming a non-trivial
collection of facts).  On a more practical level, one cannot do even
a minimal evaluation of the facts in many situations.  Consider: I see
a person trapped in a burning building.  There are number of reasons
why I might choose to rescue or not rescue that person.  I might get
killed trying.  The person may die anyhow.  He might be a millionaire
and give me a lot of money.  But I don't have time to consider these
possibilities; I must decide immediately what action to take.  Does
anyone (who believes in free will) care to argue that whatever decision
I make is not the product of free will?

>I have some final questions about REA for Paul.  Since I missed the
>full original exposition, 

I did also.  A quick reprise might be useful; otherwise I can receive
mail, too.