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From: flink@umcp-cs.UUCP (Paul V. Torek)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Third two bits on free will
Message-ID: <1026@umcp-cs.UUCP>
Date: Mon, 29-Jul-85 16:46:30 EDT
Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.1026
Posted: Mon Jul 29 16:46:30 1985
Date-Received: Tue, 30-Jul-85 10:24:06 EDT
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Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD
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In <1134@vax135.UUCP> cjp@vax135.UUCP (Charles Poirier) writes:
>[...] I suggest for the sake of
>clarity (a much-needed commodity) that we restrict our use of
>"behavior" to refer to things that are consequences of volition and
>exclude volition itself.  I further suggest that we should refrain from
>implicitly equating "free will" (self-directed volition) with "free
>behavior" (self-directed action).  Do so explicitly if you must.
>"Will" is what you want to do, not what you do do.  Ok so far?

Well, let's just say that "will" is the decisionmaking part, and
"behavior" is what happens after the decision.

>[...] If I understand it correctly (and I'm far from sure), rational
>evaluative analysis consists of analytical behavior followed by a 
>(possibly new) volitional state.

Yes.

>> In all these examples [jailing, etc.] the DIRECT cause of the
>> behavior is external to the man and his volition, THAT is what makes
>> them unfree.
>
>The so-called "acts" of being dragged away, jailed, *et cetera* I don't
>count as behavior at all.  

I was using the word "behavior" in the loose sense that scientists use,
in which one can speak of the "behavior" of crystals, electrons, or
whatever.  To be more precise I should have said "movement".

>I have some final questions about REA for Paul.  Since I missed the
>full original exposition, mail any obviously redundant answers.
>Suppose someone makes a stupid decision (or action).  Does its
>stupidity *per se* preclude its having been based on REA?  Does one
>qualify for REA if one considered the consequences of the decision in a
>way that seemed rational but "objectively wasn't" (whatever that might
>mean)?  Does one qualify if one even peripherally considered the
>consequences?  If he just accepted someone else's analysis without
>getting an opportunity to analyze for himself first?  Simply if the
>choice was self-directed?

In order:  No, but the more REA, the less likely one is to do something
that on further inspection is seen to be stupid.  No.  Yes, to some degree.
Yes, if he had evidence that the other person's analysis is likely to be
correct (e.g., the other person is generally smart).  I don't understand
the last question.
					--Paul V Torek