Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site pyuxd.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!pyuxww!pyuxd!rlr From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: The Harumpheror's Old Clothes Message-ID: <1422@pyuxd.UUCP> Date: Mon, 5-Aug-85 19:22:25 EDT Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1422 Posted: Mon Aug 5 19:22:25 1985 Date-Received: Tue, 6-Aug-85 12:43:49 EDT References: <1034@umcp-cs.UUCP> <456@utastro.UUCP> <1067@umcp-cs.UUCP> Organization: Whatever we're calling ourselves this week Lines: 114 > Let's try this again, since I don't think I'm being understood here. Rich > appears to be saying that morality (his morality, which he claims has some > universal application) derives from a shared realization that cooperation > (as Rich views it) maximizes good overall. The problem I see is that this > understanding of the world is NOT universal, perhaps not even a majority view. > For those who do not agree to this view, there will necessarily be a different > conclusion about morality's nature. But since Rich is claiming that personal > desire is the justification for this system, aren't these dissenters perfectly > justified in rejecting his system? [WINGATE] Sure, and the point is, given YOUR old friend "human nature" (e.g., the tendency of human beings to get angry and vicious towards those who wrong them, such as those who take from their cooperative society without giving), they'd be very stupid to do so. > Rich's morality seems to apply only to those people who agree that it is > true! It is not universal. This seems to hamstring it severely. Hardly. See above. > If you claim that the > system is prexisting and does not depend on assent, than this is > clearly true. But Rich is saying that his system arises out of assent to > his notion about cooperation; therefore his system is only valid for those > people who agree with Rich's principle. It's only valid in the presence of cooperating societies, you mean. Once you have some people banded together in this way, and you admit that some have the sense to do this, it is in the interest of those remaining to do so. >> c) If cooperation is the basis for the system, then non-cooperation >> can be condemned, by the system. > Perhaps so, but there can be no moral onus on those who believe that > cooperation is not advantageous. So? Then they'll lose out. No force of morality necessary. Force of REality works just fine. And if it doesn't, that becomes their problem, doesn't it? >> I would be interested in your: >> 1) definition of human nature > Well, Webster's definition will do: > "the complex of fundamental dispositions and traits of man" But what does that have to do with anything said here? >> 2) model of human nature > Now I'm going to complicate things tremendously. I don't really have a > fixed model of human nature. I'm not sure that I have a variable model. > The most I think I would claim is that people have a tendency to do evil > even though they assent to good. (This should be recognizable as the > doctrine of sin.) Uh, uh, uh, Charley. You had said that for purposes of this argument you had abandoned "Christian moral principles" (at least as an assumption, or so I thought). Define "evil". Carefully. What does it mean that people have a "tendency to do evil"? I claim that all this means is that in seeking out their wants in an unrestricted way, people have the tendency to step on other people and their wants. Not because of some hideous force of "evil" (sin) inside man that you presuppose. The very fact of cooperative agreement between people is a recognition of this fact, and a formula through which people can CONTINUE to seek out their wants with only the most minimal of restrictions, those being non-interference. >> 3) explanation as to why "rights" should be based on this model. >> (If you and a tiger were on an isolated island, your model >> should explain why one should kill the other to survive, >> and who does the killing.) > Wrong. You've moved away from rights into true moral dilemmas. Assuming that > we assign both the man and the tiger a right to survive (seems reasonable > enough if you take each in isolation), then there is a conflict in rights. > Now we've moved from rights up into true moral dilemmas. In this case, the > dilemma is whether the man should a) kill the tiger or b) let the tiger > kill him. We almost invariably assert that human rights take priority > over animal rights, so we let the man kill the tiger. Hold on. "WE"? "LET?" Are we pulling puppet strings here? No, Charley, these moral dilemmas are very important in analyzing the concept of rights. Why do "human rights take priority over animal rights"? Because WE are human! Do you think the tiger just says "Oh, uh, yeah, uh-huh, well, uh, you're a human, so, uh, go ahead and kill me!"? Not bloody likely. For the tiger, tigral rights are clearly more important (if a tiger could understand rights). So all this hooey about rights is just a matter of perspective. It's not likely that the man could form a bond of cooperation with the tiger (perhaps he might with a sea-bird, who could catch things and bring them back, or even the tiger might be domesticatable, I don't know, it would surely depend on the man and the tiger and the bird. [HUH?]). But seriously, what does human nature have to do with this notion of rights? > But this moral > principle does NOT derive directly from human nature, any more than it > derives directly from tiger nature. So? > There's an intuited principle at work: that human survival is more important. See above for an explanation of where this intuitive principle stems from. > Unless you throw morality > away completely and say, "let them fight it out and see who wins," there's > no way to resolve this without appealing to such a principle. Maybe we should then in this case. And maybe we should discard your preconceptions about morality in the general case as well. When you say "such a principle", what do you mean? -- "iY AHORA, INFORMACION INTERESANTE ACERCA DE... LA LLAMA!" Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr