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From: mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Coercion and Morality
Message-ID: <1380@umcp-cs.UUCP>
Date: Sun, 25-Aug-85 23:06:17 EDT
Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.1380
Posted: Sun Aug 25 23:06:17 1985
Date-Received: Wed, 28-Aug-85 02:34:50 EDT
References: <1571@pyuxd.UUCP>
Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD
Lines: 94

In article <1571@pyuxd.UUCP> rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) writes:

>> What bothers me is that people seem to be incoorectly drawing the
>> conclusion that, because moral systems dictate actions for individuals,
>> that they cannot properly dictate what others should do.  Unfortunately,
>> though, almost without exception any real moral system allows for
>> coercive actions; the only exceptions are those which demand absolute
>> pacifism.  It follows therefore that all moral systems do in fact have
>> standards of behavior for others besides those who hold the system.
>> Rich's little rhetorical question is therefore quite beside the point.
>> In many moral systems, it is deemed imperative to have the system
>> followed by everyone; such systems demand lots of coercive and
>> persuasive actions to try to keep others in line.  Almost
>> every system has as a basis the belief that a certain portion of the
>> population is not competent to make many judgements, moral or otherwise.
>> The real thrust of Rich's question seems to me to be that he tends to value
>> freedom more than almost anything else, for, with a different system, say
>> one that most values conformity, the answer to Rich's question could only
>> be: "Clearly the one which restricts them the most." [WINGATE]

>Ah, but this "different system" can be easily dismissed in that we can
>objectively determine what sorts of things are value-able.  Allow me to
>explain.

>Why would we value things like freedom or conformity?  Because they would
>maximize something in our lives.  Freedom maximizes our own lives, enabling
>us to make our own choices, to do what's best for us and our wants and
>desires.  Conformity maximizes benefits to that nebulous thing called
>society.  It makes it easier for society to do its business, whatever that
>may be.  It makes it easier to categorize us, to perform (what's the word
>I'm looking for?---sociometric?) studies, to exercise marketing strategies,
>and maybe to deal with other people ourselves without bothering to think of
>them as individuals.  Benefit to individual people?  Hardly any worth
>speaking of.  It all boils down to the old question:  which is more
>important, the society or its members?  Clearly if society is more
>important, then let's get rid of us people, we only get in the way of
>the proper functioning of society by merely being people.  If not, I
>think it's clear what the answer is. Society exist to perform functions
>for its members, not the other way around.

This little statement of religion is all very pretty, but it neglects several
important aspects of the picture, on top of its deliberate use of
emotionally-charged words where perfectly neutral ones would have done well.
Conformity has the enourmous advantage (to many people, anyway) that it
minimizes tensions amoung the members of a group.  It allows trust, even
reliance upon the actions of others.  It conserves the energy both of
society as whole and of individuals, by reducing the need to re-think and
readapt every time a situation appears.  All of these benefits hew directly
to individuals.  The phrasing of Rich's listing of benefits makes it
abundantly clear that this his own private evaluation of the relative merits
of these benefits.  I myself would rank conformity much higher, though not
paramount.  Others would value it still the more.  This evaluation isn't at
all objective; it's all based on which benefits Rich is willing to give up,
and which he feels he must have.

>Furthermore, Charles' persistent assumption that a morality should have some
>coercive element to it does not hold water when you look at minimal
>morality.  The basis for minimal morality is enlightened self-interest.
>You know the rules involve not interfering, so you don't OR you face the
>penalty for doing so.  Not only is that minimal restrictions, it's minimal
>coerciveness.  But Charles seems to WANT a moralty with a lot of
>restrictions.  In an earlier article, he claimed that JudaeoChristian
>morality was somehow stronger because it did have more restrictions.
>I still fail to see how this is so, or how this could used to evaluate
>moral systems.

The "persistent assumption" is no such, but raw observation.  Let us go back
to Rich's system for a minute.  I number of weeks back I argued that persons
who did not feel that "non-interference" was optimal for them had no
obligation to follow the system.  Rich in turn argued that a society with
such a moral standard was justified in preventing these people from
interfering in the way that Rich frowns upon.  Now, this is certainly
coercion, sanctioned by Rich's system.  It follows directly that there is
a standard of morality being demanded even of those who choose not to follow
the system.  Enlightened self-interest is, after all, a quaint fiction of
some use in economic theory, but quite non-existent in the real world.
Minimal restrictions are still restrictions.  And besides, I quite clearly
stated that moralities of pure pacifism do not have any coercive element in
them, so that Rich is representing me as having said something that I
explicitly denied.  Rich's system, however, DOES endorse coercion, as he
admits in the passage quoted above.

This business of strength is being persistently misunderstood.  I as stated
when I brought up the notion, it is not a measure of merit; indeed, one of
Rich's arguments against Christian morality is that it is too strong,
forbidding things that are perfectly OK.  I happen to prefer stronger
systems because I feel that the weaker systems tend to neglect the more
subtle effects of a person's behavior.  But the point is that without some
sort of scale, you have no way to compare systems without resorting to moral
values.

Charley Wingate   umcp-cs!mangoe

  "Better get used to those bars."