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From: jim@ISM780B.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Re: What is morality anyways?
Message-ID: <27500102@ISM780B.UUCP>
Date: Sat, 24-Aug-85 06:32:00 EDT
Article-I.D.: ISM780B.27500102
Posted: Sat Aug 24 06:32:00 1985
Date-Received: Wed, 28-Aug-85 20:26:54 EDT
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Nf-From: ISM780B!jim    Aug 24 06:32:00 1985


>[balter]
>I think all personal moral systems are of the form
>		    if {I desire it}
>		    then OK
>		    else not OK

[warack]
Actually, I don't think you do, because you explain what you mean later.

[balter]
I think we are quibbling over the meaning of "desire"; even you used
"desirable and undesirable behaviors" in your recapitulation of my later
explication.

>[balter]
>Warack's [actually Warack's formulation of Rosen's philosophy -chris]
>formulation above is ultra-simplistic:  how do we determine what
>a right is?  What is an infringement?  What happens when people's rights
>conflict?  Who do we include among "others"?:  women, black, gays, mammals,
>ants, rocks, ecology, mother earth?  If I were to follow the formulation
>strictly, I wouldn't be able to act at all.  2500 years ago Greeks
>were wondering whether or not they should eat beans because Pythagoras
>proscribed it; I would hope that our questions have evolved in depth and
>complexity since then.

[warack]
There actually IS a difference between morality and desire.  Desire is a
basic feeling -- a want for something [such as the sexual fantasies
mentioned before].  Morality is more rational.  It employs the
conscience.  An action may have roots in desire, but it must be filtered
through a person's morals before he can determine whether or not it is
OK.  Actually someone may have the ultra-simplistic morals if {I desire
it} then it is OK.  I think it is obvious that this person couldn't
function in society unless ... he never had a desire that conflicted
with another's.

[balter]
My dictionary says, as you seem to, that "desire" is "craving", but that
doesn't seem to me to encompass the notion of "desirable behavior" in a moral
sense.  We will probably have to keep repeating what we mean in order
to be sure that we not disagreeing only in word but not in intent.
My use of "desire" above was intended as "complex, filtered, rationally
evaluated preference", as opposed to "craving" or "simple desire" or "animal
desire" or immediate desire".

>[warack]
>How is one morality better than another?  This is probably the real issue.
>What makes one morality better?  How is that judged?  Is there a perfect
>morality?

>[wingate]
>I think you can make an evaluation based upon strength (realizing that this
>does not constitute a measure of merit).  The explicit morality of the New
>Testament, for instance, is stronger than Rich's because it includes his
>principles with additional constraints.

>[balter]
>How can you use a loaded term like strength and then say it doesn't constitute
>a measure of merit?  NT morality is more constraining than Rich's, period.
>I would suggest that a group morality is better in some sense if it closely
>aligns with the personal moralities of the members of the group, and given
>two moralities with the same level of alignment the one which is *less*
>constraining would be preferable.  As for personal moralities, they are not
>simply chosen, they are *acquired*.  Now, one could choose to alter one's
>personal morality (we're back to wanting to want).  But what it should be
>changed to, what is "better", depends uopn the goal.  The goal might be:
>to be better liked, to be more like others, be wealthier, to live longer,
>etc.  These goals can certainly be furthered by changing one's moral posture.
>But which is better?  There is only an absolute good if you select one.
>If you can prove that P is good, I assure you that you have assumed that
>P is good somewhere along the line, or you didn't prove it.

[warack]
Definite conflict of personal morals here.  Maybe someone feels that the
more constraining system is preferrable???

[balter]
I was trying to talk in some sort of universal sense here, independent of the
actual content of any morality.  *Given* that two group moral systems are
equally well aligned with the set of personal moralities, the one that imposes
fewer constraints *of its own*, separate from those of any of the personal
moralities, seems "naturally" preferable, somewhat analogously to
Occam's Razor.  If I think it is ok to do anything but snorf, and you think
it is ok to do anything but fringle, wouldn't proscription of snorfing or
fringling be preferable to proscription of snorfing, fringling, or glabbing?
However, to concede the conflict as you indicate, there doesn't seem to be
any inherent preference of a proscription against snorfing or fringling
over allowing snorfing, fringling, and anything else; I don't share the
former to the degree that it doesn't allow fringling, and I don't share
the latter because it does allow snorfing.

[warack]
There is some interesting insight into proof of goodness here.  To
inductively prove that something is good.  There has to be something
good to begin with.  Then there has to be a method to show that because
that is true, it is likely that the next is true, and so on.  To
deductively prove it; there again has to be something that has good in
it.  And either a way to show how this transfers to the object in
question or how it has the qualities necessary to infer good.  Does
anyone know how to do this without postulating 'good' somewhere along
the line???

[balter]
Seems pretty unlikely to me.

>[wingate]
>Almost any system which is based on the maximization of some good provides a
>basis for an absolute morality (even Rich's).  If one looked at all of
>history, and were sufficiently wise, one could perceive what the optimal thing
>to do in any situation would be.  This, I submit, forms an absolute for that
>moral system.  This absolute is of course obscure to us, and you can go on
>at great length about whether it implies anything at all.

>[balter]
>By absolute, you seem to mean able to provide a judgement in all situations.
>Aside from questioning that (there is no order relation for goodness), I must
>point out that "absolute morality" normally means one which is held as being
>the ONE TRUE MORALITY, having a preferred place in the order of things over
>other claimed moralities, and therefore setting down in absolute fashion what
>is right or wrong.  Relativists hold that notions of absolute right or wrong
>are semantically empty; even if some big bad bugger in the sky will zap me if
>I disobey his law, it is still only right or wrong from *his* point of view.
>But mostly it is humans with circular arguments demanding that I obey *their*
>morality.

[warack]
OK  This is the difference between 'relativists' and 'absolutists.'
Although it is possible for a RIGHT one to exist without a 'big bad
bugger.'  [Maybe its imbedded in the structure of the universe]  I have
no evidence either for or against.  It's plausible though.

[balter]
But what does it *mean* for one to be RIGHT?  How do you *demonstrate* that
that the right one is right?  The fact that some big mouthed absolutist
says so doesn't make it so.  The fact that a big bugger with a GOD label
all over it says so doesn't make it so.  How can a morality have *inherent*
preference?  It must take some logical form.  You could adopt a Panglossian
attitude that what happens is right and good and what doesn't is wrong
and bad, but that is rather too convenient and useless.  Absolutists
*believe* that their beliefs are universal in some sense, but they have
no logical force behind this belief.  I think I have good reason to hold
the absolute position to in fact be a position of arrogance.

>[wingate]
>There seems to be a near total lack of understanding of New Testament morality
>by some readers of this group.  From a pre-existent Good, an absolute of the
>kind described above is seen to exist.  God can in fact know this absolute.
>Therefore the reason we listen to God's laws is NOT simply because he is God,
>but because he is in a position to know and instruct.  Futhermore, it can be
>argued that Christian morality is universal only for Christians.  Therefore
>those who seek (for instance) to bring prayer into public schools are flatly
>wrong.

>[balter]
>Lack of understanding of an arbitrary dogma as interpreted by you?
>So what?  Pre-existing good?  That *your* god has access to?  Give me a break.
>I claim to have access to the *true* good; yours is a false version.
>Prove me wrong.

[warack]
Prove him wrong.  Arguments about this won't go anywhere.  Either of you
MIGHT be right about there being an absolute good.  I must admit,
though, that Charley has given the best argument I've seen for a reason
to abide by biblical 'morality.'

[balter]
I have no desire or ability to prove him wrong.  My point is that his position
has no weight.  He read a book and believes what it says.  So what?
What does that have to do with philosophical inquiry?  (Actually, I understand
that I am being too hard here, to the degree that Charley was simply
explaining Christian dogma; but my point is that I could have returned the
favor by explaining Blarfle dogma; the fact that his dogma has more history
or more proponents does not make it more valid).  As for a "reason" to abide
by biblical morality, you first must *accept* that there is a God with such
properties as he describes and that the bible communicates this pre-existent
Good faithfully and consistently.  But there is no "reason" to do any of that,
other than desire.  But there is *reason*, as in logic, not to, because
there does not seem to be any way to describe the nature of "good" other than
in terms of *opinion*, so that the notion of pre-existent Good seems
non-sensical without a pre-existent holder of opinions.  Pre-existent Good
is, as far as I can see, like pre-existent desire.  Whose desire?  God's.
But God communicates the Good.  Through the Bible.  Well, if you *choose*
to *believe* it.  Why should you choose to believe it?  Because God says so.
Good reason.  The point is that Charley doesn't have an *argument*, he "only"
has *faith*.

>[balter]
>Aside from all the other inconsistencies and foolishes expressed by the
>above, let me concentrate on one that is highly illustrative of the subject
>at hand:  what about those that argue that Christian morality is *not*
>universal *only* for Christians (just how can it be "universal" if it isn't
>Universal, hmmm?)?  Those who consider keeping organized (a key word;
>individual prayer is allowed) prayer out of the schools to be an immoral,
>Godless, devil-inspired goal?  They are clearly acting morally, from their
>point of view.  Thus they cannot be *flatly* wrong, only wrong from your (and
>my, BTW) POV.  If they claimed that the earth was flat, then we can argue
>that they are flatly (heh heh) wrong on the basis of empirical evidence.
>No such basis is available when arguing moral issues.

[warack]
If you believe in an absolute morality, why cannot they be '*flatly*
wrong.'  The basis for arguing moral issues MIGHT exist.  I do agree
that we don't have it in our hands now [at least knowingly].  I don't
think it is fair to say no such basis exists.

[balter]
The mere fact that you believe in an absolute morality gives you no right
to claim access to it.  I said no such basis is *available*, to Charley
or anyone else.  He can say he *considers* them wrong.  Going beyond that is
arrogance (in my opinion, of course).  In this case, he can't even quote the
bible (actually, I would be delighted to learn that I am wrong, that there is
a biblical passage indicating that mandated school prayer violates the
pre-existent Good (I would put a `:-)', if I didn't find the joke of p-e G
so pathetic).

>[wingate]
>(Note that this doesn't absolve Rich of having to follow his own
>morality!)

>[balter]
>Here we have that fundamental misunderstanding of what morality is.
>Absolve?  Have to?  What do these words mean in this context?
>What happens if Rich proclaims a morality and then fails to follow it?
>Will a big thunderbolt labeled "morality enforcement" strike him dead?
>Morality is a codification of the behaviors that an individual or group
>finds good or bad, where good and bad are primitive (mathematical
>sense) concepts related to desired and undesired behaviors.
>Rich may establish a general rule of good and bad, perform an action,
>and then decide the action was bad within his rules.  Depending upon whether
>his emotional response to the action is that it really is good or really
>is bad, he is likely to either modify his rules to allow that behavior as
>acceptable, or feel guilt and attempt to reorient himself in a way such
>that he won't perform the action again (from mental scolding to hara kiri);
>or it is possible that he will actually enjoy having performed the action
>and intend to repeat it, in which case his "morality" is a charade,
>perhaps borrowed from his community (cf. previous discussion about Hell's
>Angels) and his true inner morality is somewhat different.
>In the same way, a group's true morality may be different than what is
>professed in official dogma; examples are boundless.

[warack]
This seems to me to be a much more thorough understanding behind
personal morality than stated at the beginning of the discussion.
I'm going to attempt to restate these points as I take them.
A personal morality is an individual's mechanism for determining what is
desired or undesired behavior [for himself].  A person may change his
behavior to abide by his morality.  He may also decide that his morality
is flawed and change it.  He may present one morality to others
while following another himself.  Morality is intrinsic in causing
guilt.

[balter]
I think this needs to be extended; I can consider another's actions to be
immoral.  This means I find them undesirable.  It isn't clear that this
means exactly that I would think it wrong of me, even if I were in the
other's shoes, since a moral system is not formal, exact, unambiguous, or
nonfluctuating.  Your action is immoral; you shouldn't do it; it isn't good.
I am pretty much convinced that the notion of "good" is primitive within the
human psychological mechanism.  Smiles, "positive" mood swings, pleasure,
perhaps lowered blood pressure, all kinds of physiological and mental
(= physiological, for the mechanists) effects accompany "good" things,
often resulting in repeating good things or causing them to be repeated.
I think the notion that good and bad are "out there" rather than "in here"
comes from a fundamental rejection by the organism that it is in fact an
organism, rather than some sort of pure rational entity tapped into some
sort of idealized "real" world (for more on this concept of the real mind as
only an approximation of the idealized mind, see Dennett's "Elbow Room";
the book is quite literally "thought provoking").

-- Jim Balter (ima!jim)