Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site pyuxd.UUCP Path: utzoo!watmath!clyde!burl!ulysses!gamma!pyuxww!pyuxd!rlr From: rlr@pyuxd.UUCP (Rich Rosen) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: Re: LAST WORD on "souls" (I hope!) Message-ID: <1619@pyuxd.UUCP> Date: Thu, 29-Aug-85 23:25:26 EDT Article-I.D.: pyuxd.1619 Posted: Thu Aug 29 23:25:26 1985 Date-Received: Sat, 31-Aug-85 06:25:07 EDT References: <581@utastro.UUCP> <1322@umcp-cs.UUCP> <588@utastro.UUCP> <1364@umcp-cs.UUCP> <1589@pyuxd.UUCP> <1411@umcp-cs.UUCP> Organization: Whatever we're calling ourselves this week Lines: 53 >>True, Paul. But what makes the person at time A the same person at time B? >>What relates the two "persons" such that they can be said to be the same >>person? > Well, for example, the person at time B might have the exact same physical > structure, molecule by molecule, as the person had at time A. He would > then have all the same mental qualities (assuming, as I think we two agree, > that Cartesian dualism is wrong). He would then be, for all practical > purposes, the same person. I'm not saying that all this is physically > possible, of course (but then, I don't believe in Wingate's God). > > (Technically though, the person at time B (call him Bob) would not be the > same person as the one at time A (call him Al), unless he was causally > descended from A in such a way that there could not be two identical people > produced at time B by the same process. Otherwise, Bob would "merely" > be an exact *copy* of Al. I put the word "merely" in scare-quotes because, > rationally, it should not make a difference to anyone, including Al, > whether Bob will be Al or an exact copy.) You're right about the perfect copy idea, but of course that brings us to the old transporter argument. If a transporter existed that scanned your body at point A, "disassembled" it, and reconstructed it at point B, you might have the following problem. If the transporter's scanning-at-point-A and reconstructing-at-point-B functions worked, but the disassembler didn't, would there then be two "you"s after the faulty process had completed? The proper phrasing of the question would be "would there be two of the same person?" The answer in either case is no. Since Charles has repeatedly denied his belief in souls, we can skip over them and assume that a material copy produces an exact copy of the "person". Each person will assert (if it was me that was transported, for example) that he is Rich Rosen. And since a Rosen by any other name (ARRRGGH! :-) would still be as Rich, since a name is just a pointer to a person, and since lots of people are named Rich Rosen, there is no problem: there is now one more. So much for the two "you"s notion. But would there be two of the SAME person?" I still say no. Yes, the copy would be an exact copy at the moment of reproduction, but thereafter the very different experiences that each would have would make them different people. It is roughly analogous to the production of identical twins. At one point, you have one zygote, at a subsequent point you have two fetuses that are exact copies of each other. As they grow and mature, even before they are born, they differentiate and diverge so that by the time they are born they are in fact different people. Thus, I can see Charlie's point about exact replication being the resurrection. However, there is one catch. If you are reproduced as you are at the moment of death, when you are reconstructed, what will you be? Dead. Some resurrection! :-) Of course, god could arbitrarily choose some point before death, but I don't think that would classify as resurrection, in that you would be reconstructed at a point before you had experienced death. I'm not sure if that makes a difference, but it sounds like it does. -- Meanwhile, the Germans were engaging in their heavy cream experiments in Finland, where the results kept coming out like Swiss cheese... Rich Rosen ihnp4!pyuxd!rlr