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From: mangoe@umcp-cs.UUCP (Charley Wingate)
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Definitions of Morality
Message-ID: <1445@umcp-cs.UUCP>
Date: Thu, 29-Aug-85 21:35:36 EDT
Article-I.D.: umcp-cs.1445
Posted: Thu Aug 29 21:35:36 1985
Date-Received: Sun, 1-Sep-85 09:35:27 EDT
References: <374@aero.UUCP> <27500106@ISM780B.UUCP>
Organization: U of Maryland, Computer Science Dept., College Park, MD
Lines: 75

In article <27500106@ISM780B.UUCP> jim@ISM780B.UUCP writes:

>>MORAL ABSOLUTE - A principle concerning morality which is absolutely true,
>>                 regardless of which moral system you subscribe to.

>>(not to be confused with absolute morals)


>  Why did you state "not to be
>confused with absolute morals" if you were going to ignore it?

The point is that moral absolutes need not be morals in and of themselves.
They can be principles and statements which provide the basis for the actual
moral statements.

>>ABSOLUTE MORAL RELATIVISM - the idea that it is impossible to conclude that
>>                any particular moral system is correct.

>>The curious fact is, absolute moral relativism is self-contradictory,
>>because it states a moral absolute.

>AMR makes a statement *about* moral systems; it does not in any way state
>a *moral* absolute.  The absolute statement it makes is not a *moral*
>statement.

It is a moral absolute, because it is an absolute statement about moral
systems.  The fact that it is not in itself a moral command is irrelevant.

Then we have a paradox:

>	+---------------------------------------------------------+
>	|   1) Exactly one of the statements in this box is false.|
>	|                                                         |
>	|   2) Charley Wingate exists.                            |
>	+---------------------------------------------------------+

>If the first statement is true, then the second statement is false.
>But, if the first statement is false, then the second statement cannot
>be true, because then the first statement would be true, not false.
>So the second statement is false.

>As with your argument, the logic seems designed to produce the desired
>conclusion regardless of its content.

Unfortunately, if it is at all applicable, AMR is analogous to the *first*
statement in the box.  I think, however, that it is more closely analogous to
the barber paradox.  Taken as strongly as I have stated it, AMR is in fact a
self-referential statement.  If you weaken it so that it only applies to
moral strictures, then the self-reference obviously goes away; but this
makes it perfectly acceptable to refuse to consider a system because it is
(supposedly) groundless.  As it stands, however, it can in fact have a value
of false if some other absolute truth exists which can be used to
descriminate between systems.

>I suggest that you read Richard Smullyan's "What is the Name of This Book?".
>You are making a fundamental logical error of confusing statements *about*
>moral systems with *moral* statements *within* moral systems.  The latter
>are statements about desired human behavior, not about moral systems.
>Aquinas and Berkley argued for the *logical* existence of God with arguments
>which, like yours, are as logically flawed as arguments that all numbers are
>equal, via hidden use of division by zero.

I have read the book; what you are neglecting is the fact the bases of some
systems include statements *about* other systems.  One can only resolve this
problem in one of three ways.  One can reject all systems which make
statements about other systems: this clearly invalidates AMR.  One can
reject any demands for logica consistency, in which case it becomes
impossible to talk about morality on any level in any rational way.  Or
finally, one can reject AMR, and admit the possibility of rejecting the
bases of some systems on rational grounds.  It's significant that forms of
relativism which allow rational criticism only of the moral strictures
themselves avoid this problem completely.  But these all allow one to reject
the basis of a system, and thus imply that relativism is not complete.

Charley Wingate