Relay-Version: version B 2.10 5/3/83; site utzoo.UUCP Posting-Version: version B 2.10.2 9/18/84; site spar.UUCP Path: utzoo!linus!decvax!decwrl!spar!ellis From: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) Newsgroups: net.philosophy Subject: External Influences Message-ID: <492@spar.UUCP> Date: Fri, 30-Aug-85 12:31:24 EDT Article-I.D.: spar.492 Posted: Fri Aug 30 12:31:24 1985 Date-Received: Sun, 1-Sep-85 11:43:49 EDT References: <3518@decwrl.UUCP> <1451@pyuxd.UUCP> <661@psivax.UUCP> <1555@pyuxd.UUCP> <675@psivax.UUCP> <1607@pyuxd.UUCP> Reply-To: ellis@spar.UUCP (Michael Ellis) Organization: Schlumberger Palo Alto Research, CA Lines: 125 >>>I think we are dealing in the same definition of free here: unconstrained >>>by dependencies on other things. [RLR] > >> The definition I use is "unconstrained by *external* >> factors", that is "not controlled from *without*". This definition >> is in my dictionary(American Heritage Collegiate) and is the one used >> by a number of major philosophers when talking about human will. It >> differs from yours in the emphasized words, and this makes a large >> difference in requirements for the existence of free will. [Friesen] > >Hardly. Since the current configuration of the mind is determined (more >than just slightly) by external experiences, is that not an external >constraint? I'd really like to know why you can so easily dismiss this >by saying "oh, but that's in the past, we're talking about right now", >as if it was somehow exempt. [Rosen] But the past DOES NOT EXIST any more. The past has turned into the present moment. You have not recognized that a phenomenon can be described in two different ways: (1) Instantaneously, as a time slice -- in which case, all past experiences have been incorporated into the present moment, via memories, structure, momentum, impinging causes etc. External in this case can only mean that which is physically outside of the entity in question, but entirely within the current timeslice (assuming materialistic metaphysics). (2) As a Godlike viewer, examining all events transpiring within an interval of time, in which case, external means outside of the entity's `world tube'. Neither method of description is incorrect -- in principle, given a suitable instantaneous definition of a phenomenon, one ought to be able to examine the structure of its worldtube. Now Mr. Friesen is speaking in instantaneous terms; therefore, Rich, your comments about past experiences are irrelevant, unless you restate them in present-moment terms (eg - memories, habits, momentum, impinging causes..). >And even if it were, aren't there events >going on right now in the external world that affect the current decision? >How much light there is in the room. How hot it is. What sights, sounds, >smells, etc. happen to be around you at the time. Don't those factors >alter your choice of action? Is it really free? Very good points. The actual state of the environment does not directly affect me until it encounters the causal nexus -- the point where cause meets effect. Exactly where do we draw this arbitrary boundary where causal chains cross from external to internal (or vice versa)? Most input must pass from its initial neural encounter through many transformations including some fairly high-level interpretations before `I' actually become aware of it. Some knee-jerk items elicit immediate and totally unwilled response -- and these are typically not considered to be the actions of `free will'. The filtering of one's internal data structuring mechanisms is powerful. For instance, a red ace of spades among normal cards is usually seen as an ace of hearts. Preconceptions and low level sensory habits all work to shield one's carefully evolved internal structures (intentions, semantics, beliefs..) and thereby maintain psychological coherence. Most causal chains from the outside are dispersed or deflected before they go very deep. We see what we want to see, thereby providing a sanctuary from causality wherein internal entities can either evolve or fossilize, relatively untouched from external constraint. What kinds of entities? Not physical objects, but rather, externally perceivable patterns of behavior that can be born, remain inflexible or grow, and die, things like habits, preferences, purposes, etc. As nonphysical entities, they are largely unaffected by most physical forces. For example, I will probably like music until I die, whatever else may happen. Brainwashing techniques could alter that. Taking advantage of this vulnerability by force of self will, it is possible to plant, encourage, or thwart the patterns and filters that create subjective reality. Free will should at times resemble a self-modifying B.F.Skinner in order to escape the constraints of habit and other unwanted relics from the past. We are usually in autopilot, performing mundane rituals. I think free will is normally a dormant trait, a kind of spontaneous integrity that rises out from the depths, like the Russian legend Ilya Mourometz, who awakes from literally monolithic slumber as necessary to alter destiny, ideally with force appropriate to the severity of the decision at hand. Free will does NOT mean insensitivity to experience. On the contrary, it means transforming impinging causes into creative action thereby infusing one's character into causal chains that may well return as future experiences. Consequently, we blend into our evolving feedback loops, and, if we act in goodwill (whatever that is), external events become healthy extensions of self. For example, the acts of close friends and lovers are events I usually wish to be affected by. Most importantly, free will entails the ability to explore unknown regions where one is certain to be bombarded by external CAUSES, hardly the same as CONSTRAINTS. Don't most people want to experience new things? Even a fatal blunderer who, falling from a cliff, faces immediate and certain annihilation, can be totally free. With impeccable free will, you would take care not to overlook the delicate beauty of any fortuitously blossoming flowers you passed on the way down... You see, with free will, all is possible! >> And that same dictionary defines free will as "the power or >> discretion to choose" and "man's choices are ... not determined by >> *external* causes", which definitions clearly are based on the >> definitions I am using, not the more restrictive one you are using. > >They're only "more restrictive" in that I don't nonchalantly exempt >past external influences because they interfere with my conclusion. >And given the other examples I offer above, they don't work even if >you could just exempt the past. The past does not exist. It has become the present. -blissfully nonexistent