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From: jim@ISM780B.UUCP
Newsgroups: net.philosophy
Subject: Re: Re: What is morality anyways?
Message-ID: <27500117@ISM780B.UUCP>
Date: Fri, 30-Aug-85 01:46:00 EDT
Article-I.D.: ISM780B.27500117
Posted: Fri Aug 30 01:46:00 1985
Date-Received: Sun, 1-Sep-85 13:10:59 EDT
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Nf-From: ISM780B!jim    Aug 30 01:46:00 1985


>[balter]
>My dictionary says, as you [warack] seem to, that "desire" is "craving", 
>but that doesn't seem to me to encompass the notion of "desirable 
>behavior" in a moral sense.  We will probably have to keep repeating 
>what we mean in order to be sure that we not disagreeing only in word 
>but not in intent.  My use of "desire" above was intended as "complex, 
>filtered, rationally evaluated preference", as opposed to "craving" or 
>"simple desire" or "animal desire" or immediate desire".

[torek]
I think your definition of desire, while not unusual, is so loose as to
make it a useless concept.  I.e., all the air has gone out of your
statement about morality and desire once you define desire so loosely.

[balter]
I disagree.  I find it useful; you claim it isn't; why should I care what
you claim without argument?  At the very least, you should
explain what "desirable behavior" means, since that was my grounds for
rejecting "craving" as a sufficient definition.  And I don't need much air,
since I gave a fuller description of morality later.

>[balter]
>[...]  If they claimed that the earth was flat, then we can argue
>that they are flatly (heh heh) wrong on the basis of empirical evidence.
>No such basis is available when arguing moral issues.

[torek]
How about individual benefit?  Empirical evidence is available on that,
and it's obviously relevant to interpersonal morality.  For (admittedly
rather trivial) example, if someone is doing something that harms himself
and others, and helps nobody, we can argue that he should stop, and we
have an empirical basis to appeal to.  (And unfortunately, people do
that sort of thing more often than you might think!)
 
[balter]
You say individual benefit but you talk about lack of physical bodily harm;
while the latter can be objectified, I have not seen anything indicating that
the former can.  And there are many societies and conditions where it is not
immoral to harm your wife, your children, members of other societies, your
equals in duels, members of other races who aren't considered quite human,
etc.  Of course all moral judgements are statements about empirical
realities, but there is no empirical evidence for goodness or badness itself.
We have to *decide* (or, more often, *believe*, since morality is primarily
acquired, not chosen) that harming others is bad.  But this is based on
evolutionary conditioning that favors continuance of the species; randomly
plucking flowers, smashing rocks, or squashing spiders (certainly a
non-self-beneficial act for a human) is not considered by most to be
*immoral* (although it is by some Bhuddists).  Killing a friendly dog or a
deer strikes many as more immoral than killing a field mouse, probably
because the former seem more loving and childlike, and we *empathize* with
them.  I have no reason to view morality to be anything other than
human-generated.  But this does not lead me to reject my morality or live for
so-called "self-interest"; I find that accepting my personal morality, which
involves such empathy with and protection of other humans, is very rewarding
and beneficial and in my true self-interest, whereas acquisition of goods or
power, while of some value, is much the lesser in terms of providing
satisfaction.

>[balter]
>I think the notion that good and bad are "out there" rather than "in here"
>comes from a fundamental rejection by the organism that it is in fact an
>organism, rather than some sort of pure rational entity tapped into some
>sort of idealized "real" world (for more on this concept of the real mind as
>only an approximation of the idealized mind, see Dennett's "Elbow Room";
>the book is quite literally "thought provoking").

[torek]
Funny, I would say just the opposite:  forgetting you're an organism is
the source of the idea that good and bad are "in here", where "here" is
the mind.  Our bodies make good and bad "out there" in the sense that
they are recalcitrant like the rest of reality; one can't "decide" a la
Sartre, R.M. Hare, etc. what they are.  (J. Habermas aptly calls the 
views of people like Hare and Sartre "decisionistic".  He rejects
their position -- he must be brilliant, he agrees with me! :-> ).)

[balter]
I agree that good and bad are "out there" in the sense that you cannot
simply decide what to view as good and what to view as bad, though you can
come to feel differently, and you yourself can contribute to such a change.
I'm glad you made that very good point.  But while they may not be "in here"
in the mind and subject to simple manipulation, they are no further
"out there" than in your brain; your good and bad are not out there in the
"real world" in some absolute form where they control any mind but yours.
All the other minds have their own distinct, controlling, recalcitrant,
notions of good and bad.  Of course, due to common origins and influences
there is great commonality and similarity among the minds, but forgetting
biological humility leads to raising these commonalities to absolutes.

-- Jim Balter (ima!jim)